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PREFACE

The issue of urban education has evoked a flood of
books

indicating its failures and a freshet of essays proposing
reform or
revolutions.

institutions?

But where are the studies of successful educational
The Autobiography of Malcolm X has shown that an

individual could overcome the disadvantages of miseducation
poverty, of discrimination, and of despair.

,

of

Yet it left unanswered

the question of whether institutions might serve as a vehicle for

many persons to learn and to succeed in a society marked by racism
and economic competition.
The Westside Study Center was a community action organization

directed toward innovative responses to the problems of urban education
in Pasadena, California.

This dissertation analyzes the establishment

and development of the Center from May 1965 through the fall of 1968,

during which time

I

served as Executive Director.

In addition to documenting the story of Westside, I have tried
to present an analysis of urban community relations.

Westside Study

Center worked with persons in power and persons kept from power, with
Blacks and whites, with shy children and militant youths, with law

enforcement officers and concerned parents, with professors from the

California Institute of Technology and functionally illiterate adults.
Secondly, the Center illustrated the potential of New Careers

paraprofessional programs in the human services.

Hard core unemployed

youths who showed promise were brought in as aides.

As soon as

possible aides were promoted to assistants and as high as component
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directors.

Most of the top Westside staff were
enrolled in courses at

California State College at Los Angeles in
order to improve their own
skills and to gain the degree necessary for professional
employment.
Finally,

I

have tried to demonstrate in the story of
Westside

the importance of a positive attitude for making people
feel that they

can do something meaningful.

That hope factor is essential for

education, as well as for jobs and community life.

As a self help

organization, the Westside Study Center took people from a negative

attitude toward a positive attitude.

The Center permitted people to

feel that they could do whatever their goals were.

Perhaps the Center's

greatest success was in building the "hope factor."
I

am grateful for the interest, energy, and time which several

persons gave in the preparation of this study.

The opportunity to

undertake a research effort of this kind was provided through an
important experiment in education at. the University of Massachusetts,
a "revolution" in graduate school training led by Dean Dwight W. Allen.
I

thank Dr. Richard

J.

Clark who served on my dissertation

committee and gave invaluable advice and support.

Dr.

Byrd L. Jones

offered his time, knowledge, and personal concern while the manuscript
was being prepared.

Historian, economist, and educator. Dr. Jones'

expertise was invaluable.

I

am especially grateful to Dr. Robert L.

Woodbury, my major advisor, who encouraged me when the road seemed

difficult and offered his insights about urban education and the
politics of public policy.
I

am indebted to the many people who read parts of the

manuscript and offered helpful comments:

iv

Tim Anderson, Larry Cohen,

Carolyn Peelle, Royce Phillips, and
Barbara Woodbury.

I appreciate

the special diligence and concern
of Judy Glazier and Janice Green

who typed the manuscript.
This thesis would never have been
written if my friends and

colleagues at the Westside Study Center had
not devoted many hours
to creating a viable organization and
program:

Board Members

A.

Lionel Larsuel

Co-founders and
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Mrs. Barbara Blair, H. Burton Housman, Dr. Lester
Lees, Emmett G.

Mickle, and Mrs. Miriam Pettier; and Staff Members
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CHAPTER
WESTSIDE STUDY CENTER:

I

THE IDEA OF SELF HELP

In May 1965, Atron A. Gentry,
A. Lionel Larsuel, Billy

Williams and other young adults
established the Westside Study Center
as a self help organization
for the Northwest Pasadena-Altadena
area.

Located in the western end of the San
Gabriel Valley of Los Angeles
County, Pasadena had grown from a
retirement community founded in 1873
into an important city of 180,000 people,
some fifteen per cent of

whom were Black.

Home of such famous institutions as the Rose
Bowl

parade and the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, Pasadena
had more than smog
and freeway construction to suggest its urban
status.

In 1969 Pasadena

became the first school district west of the Mississippi
to be sued
by the Justice Department for segregated schools.

1

Motivated by a desire to do something about the serious problems
in their community ,

the founders built an organization which survived

and grew into a model for successful urban education.

became many things to many people:

The Center

a place on North Fair Oaks Avenue

where local residents made more than a thousand visits a week; a group
of people, black and white, working together to make something happen;

1.
See articles in The New York Times on Pasadena’s school
segregation suit: November 20, 1968, p 28 April 7, 1969, p.33;
April 24, 1969, p.19; January 5, 1970, p.l; January 21, 1970, p.38.
.

1

;

2

a coordinated series of programs
emphasizing education and job

development reaching hard core
poverty persons; and a vehicle
through
which people could help others and
help
themselves.

Gentry, Larsuel, and Williams did
not have to search out

people in need.

In the census tracts around the
Center one out of

every three families earned less
than a poverty income.
four adults was looking for a job.

One out of

Washington Elementary School,

just a block away, enrolled less than
ten per cent whites, reflecting
a serious separation of races in the
school system.

That system failed

with the many Blacks who dropped out before
high school; and a majority
of Blacks who graduated could not read beyond
the fifth grade level.

The Center staff knew the problems of
discrimination and

deprivation first hand.

Still overcoming their own miseducation in

California’s public schools, they hoped that they could devise
methods
and attitudes to help children in Pasadena's schools learn basic

skills in reading and arithmetic.

Still recalling with anger their

own fears and feelings of inadequacy imparted by bigoted and indifferent
teachers, coaches, and counselors, the founders hoped to motivate

2.
Most of the material on Westside Study Center is from the
official and personal files of the Director of the Center, which the
author was for four years. Also see the bibliography for a list of
proposals and other descriptive material.

For a description of the area around the Westside Study
3.
Center, see "Neighborhood Social Diagnostic Survey," prepared in
cooperation with the Community Redevelopment Agency of Pasadena,
April 1967.
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children with a fresh sense that
difficulties could be overcome.
Tutoring on a one to one basis
could break through some fears
about
learning while providing enough
additional practice in reading and
arithmetic.
A little personal attention, the
Westside volunteers
hoped, might overcome the failings
of the school system and enable

more children to gain an education.

Although the Westside Study Center in
Pasadena became one of
the few successful community action agencies,
the founders later re-

called their innocence, inexperience, and
naivete.

With some books

on spelling and phonetics and some time
on weekends and evenings,

Gentry, Williams, and Larsuel were going to
change Pasadena's schools
and their community.

They had enthusiasm, sincerity and a sense

that they were testing an important means for overcoming
racism and

poverty.

The real test came when sincerity and desire proved in-

sufficient.

New attacks, new programs, new approaches had to be

found to reach a goal of making the Center a vehicle for self help
in Northwest Pasadena.

The staff would have to learn and grow in

order to cope with larger dimensions of the problems.
In three long years, Westside became a viable organization

because it grew and built upon its established strengths.

From the

first, the staff had an unusual dedication to their primary task of

helping people.

Incorporating that dedication into its own organization,

the staff operated on a New Careers basis.

Hard core unemployed

youths who showed promise were brought in as aides; as soon as possible
aides were promoted to assistants and as high as component directors.

4

Many of the Westside staff were
enrolled in courses at California
State College at Los Angeles in
order to improve their own skills
and to gain the degree which would
expand their employment opportunities

A second source of strength depended
upon

a coordinated

approach so that Westside' s educational
and communications services
both supported and gained support from
its job development and

counseling services.

For example, when a youth telephoned from
the

courtroom after an arrest, Westside staff would
speak on his behalf.
Most youths needed help rather than a sentence
in juvenile court.

Usually municipal and juvenile judges would assign the
youth to the

Center rather than to jail.

Then the staff would talk over the

youth's problems, perhaps arranging for special tutoring and for
his return to school.

Often a lack of money had caused the initial

problem, and Westside located part-time work.

By providing a sense

of support and hope in all areas, Westside could affect someone's
life.

A third key to Westside's success was its broad range of
active supporters

— unmatched

by any other agency working in the city.

Westside staff worked with men who had more items in their arrest
sheet than words in their active vocabulary; and the staff met with

business men and city officials in sensitivity sessions.

Tutoring

drew functional illiterates, elementary school children having

difficulties assimilating the white culture of their reading texts,

high school drop-outs attending special classes in order to earn a
general education diploma, workers seeking special vocational skills,

5

and college-level Negroes
seeking special training in
writing.
Business men, school board members,
and retired citizens stopped
by to see what was happening.
Often they volunteered their
services.
Fourth, whether the Study Center
had outside financial

support or relied upon the staff to
volunteer their time, Westside
had convinced poor people in the Los
Angeles area that it offered

more than a meaningless promise and
another referral.

Similarly,

business men had learned to respect the
work of the Center and its

continued interest in the persons placed in
jobs.
as the courts,

Such organizations

the city police, and city schools asked
Westside for

assistance in dealing with poor people.
Strongly motivated to make their organization survive
and
grow, committed to their dream of creating a vehicle
for growth and

change, the staff at Westside built learning into their
whole

operation.

Never content to repeat past successes, they continually

faced situations and problems requiring new skills, new contacts, and

new risks.

Using paraprofessionals wherever possible, experienced

staff trained new aides.

The efficiency of the organization was

never defined in terms of lessons tutored, jobs found, or counseling
sessions conducted.

Those tasks had meaning only if they helped

people to survive and find hope in the system.

That purpose gave

a unity of staff and meaning to the Westside Study Center as it

sought on-going support and a chance to affect Pasadena.

6

2.

An Historical Sketch

For approximately one
year, the Center operated
as a

volunteer tutoring and counseling
service.

Organized by young

black adults, Westside started
with the idea of helping
children to
read and spell.
Volunteers from the community and
from local high
schools and colleges were
recruited to tutor children and
young people
on a one to one basis.
Initially the Study Center focused
on reading,

arithmetic, and writing.

Too many black children were
turned off

by the standard "white-oriented''
curriculum of Pasadena's schools.
As more persons came who needed
help or who had skills to

volunteer, Westside accepted a larger
task.

Finding part time

employment might keep a youth in high
school, where his problems had
less to do with learning than with
his own self concept.

Sometimes

the key lay in a discussion with the
school's counselor who was not

communicating well with a child.

Often Westside staff talked with

parents in an effort to enlist their help in
supporting a child's
study.

Many times the staff had to work with a tutor who
knew

calculus but could not cope with black children.

Soon a large

proportion of time by the staff went toward arranging, mediating,
and
counseling between other volunteer tutors or agency officials and
tutees

The need for a paid, full time staff became increasingly

apparent.

Organizing volunteers required as a minimum a place and

a telephone as well as files.

But more importantly, without some

permanent staff there could be no effective follow up and no real

7

development o£ staff contacts
and knowledge.

In order to carry out
its intent of helping
people by using the resources
of the co»unity,

Westside had to achieve a
base of support for Its
operations. It
needed an opportunity to
demonstrate its skills and Its
ability to
improve education in Pasadena.
During the summer of 1966,
the Center received summer
"crash"
funds from the Office of
Economic Opportunity (0E0) .
With a grant
of $50,000 the Center proved
that its pioneering work in
education.
New Careers and job development,
counseling, community services,
and communication could be expanded
into significant and inter-related
programs.

More than 70 jobs, for example, were
found for adults in

the Pasadena area during the summer/

For a short time, Westside Study
Center became more than a

perpetual demonstration project, a token
community action program.
It had action, charisma, success,
and a noticeable impact on the

community.

But Federal funds ceased on September
30, 1966.

had to remain alive on hope and small private
donations.

The Center

A favorable

evaluation prepared by the Los Angeles Community Action
Agency
provided small comfort.

4.
See Thomas A. Anderson and Harry Krasnick, "Westside Study
Center
Youth Development Program Final Evaluation Report," Economic
and Youth
Opportunities Agency of Greater Los Angeles, November 1966, Appendix
B:
Job Development Component Statistics.
See also Westside Study Center
Master Proposal, Job Development component and pages 84-92
of this text.
5.
Anderson and Krasnick commented that Westside had "...begun to
have a marked effect in solving the problems of alienated, poverty
youth in Northwest Pasadena-Altadena. " "Westside Study Center," p.2.
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Nevertheless, the Center did not fade
away after that sunder.
A low-cost volunteer tutoring program
continued with over forty
tutors and eighty students.

Most of the staff who had worked
during

that summer stayed on without funds.

The spring of 1967 was a

building period; new projects and
new programs were developed on a
shoestring.
Local business pledges and private
support grew rapidly.
Again In the summer of 1967, crash funds
became available
from 0E0.
component.

But $10,000 provided only enough to
operate a job development

That component employed youths as aides in
teams to

contact local firms and ferret out employment
opportunities.

Usually

Westside staff counseled both prospective employees
and employers in
pre- and post- job training.

With their experience from the previous

summer, Westside aides established good working relationships
with

many Pasadena firms so that counseling could reach people before on
job problems had accumulated.

As a result, Westside placed more

than one hundred persons in meaningful and continuing jobs.

Because of that success and because of growing support within
the Northwest community, Pasadena's Commission on Human Need and

Opportunity (PCHNO) supported a similar program fpr the three month
period from October

1 to

December 31, 1967.

During that period,

sixty-seven placements were made. In the meantime, private donations
and volunteer time supported the other components of a rounded

See proposal to PCHNO by Westside Study Center for 1967
6.
contained in official files of the director.
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community action agency.

Indeed, only the leverage
in the conmunity

from those other programs
enabled Westside to have enough
clout so that
federal money was reluctantly
granted to Westside. Hence the
PCHNO
finally granted $40,000 for
the 1968 year, which modestly
put Westside
on an annual basis for the
first time.
As of the summer of 1968, then,
the Westside Study Center

operated from three sites and six
small buildings in the poverty area.
Its work fell into four main
functions:
(1) job development, (2) education, (3) community services, and
(4) public relations.

Each component

had a director with several aides and
Neighborhood Youth Corps clerktypists under his guidance, as well as
several volunteers who did

work ranging from typing addresses to
providing comprehensive
management consultation.

Westside' s expenditures ran about $15,000

per month, including $2,000 per month from pledged
private donations.
Those figures, however, grossly understated its impact,
which was

augmented by the many unpaid volunteers who helped Westside
not
only at the Center buildings but also in the city.

Only the job development component had federal support, and
it had achieved an astonishing record of success because it had

worked with the other supporting services.

Tutoring at all levels

remained the most common meeting ground where Blacks learned about
the Center as a place to seek help.

In the tutoring program,

people from outside and inside the immediate community came together
to make a meaningful contribution of their time and skills.

Those

two components which reached hard core poverty persons that other

10

agencies did not wish to see gave
Westside an undeniable role in
the
community. Also, they gave Westside
its best hard evidence of
performance and effectiveness for outsiders
who asked for documentation
and evaluation.
Westside* s other two components proved
equally important for

making an impact on Pasadena.

Community services developed a close

and effective relationship with the Pasadena
Police Department and

with municipal and juvenile courts.

During early 1968, Center staff

members counseled more than 164 individuals.

In most cases those

persons were released by the courts under the
recognizance of the
Center.

That service won respect and support from a part
of the

community not reached in a helpful way by any other agency.

The

public relations component coordinated the growing activities

— speeches,

basic encounter sessions, open forums, and news releases- —through which

Westside communicated with both whites and Blacks.
Probably the most encouraging signs in the spring of 1968

were indications of a growing awareness among business men that job
training and job development for ghetto residents were more than a
government boondoggle designed to prevent riots and minor civil
disturbances.

Spurred by military demand for the war in Viet Nam,

businesses needed laborers.

Significantly, the Pasadena Independent

Star - News ran a special series of seven articles which presented
the Center's story to a larger audience.

In conjunction with that

series in the local paper, a Business Advisory Committee undertook
to raise funds by seeking on-going monthly pledges from local

11

businesses.

Despite gratifying indications of
support, such business

contributions provided less than one
seventh of the Center's .odest
budget.
By fall 1968, three and a half
years after its inception,

Westside had become a viable agency.

In part that meant its reputation

its support, and its acceptance
by major elements of the Pasadena

community were established.

Spokesmen for Westside were interviewed

by reporters when sampling opinions on
local events.

In part, that

change meant Westside could take fewer
risks with people and programs
than it had one year earlier.

It had greater leverage, but it had a

responsibility to avoid mistakes.
The staff deserved great credit for having survived,
grown,

and established a community action agency against the
odds, but their

organizational style had to change.
dependable time.

Volunteered time was not always

From the beginning, the Center had relied less

on extrinsic rewards of money and job experience than upon intrinsic
rewards such as mutual loyalty and support, and a humane and open

attitude toward others’ strengths and weaknesses.

After the summer of

1966, there was the charisma of black Pasadenans making an indifferent

and often bigoted city take notice.

Finally, and most important

for

the growth of the Center, there had been the key staff’s commitment to

7.
Pasadena Independent Star-News series of articles on the
Westside Study Center, February 18-25, 1968.
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the idea of self help and the hope factor
in motivating change. 8

3.

The Idea of Self Help

From the start, the young black Pasadenans associated
with

Westside wanted to do something positive with their
own lives as well
as for other people.

Self help was a complex notion since it had to

come from within themselves before it could be sold as
an idea to

other Blacks.

It involved the subtle problem of creating the power

to control at least a part of one's own life and a part of one's
own

community— a power which lay at the heart of individual freedom.
it involved a cruel paradox.

And

From the point of view of many in the

ghetto, anyone who had boots with straps had already escaped.

How

could he relate to those who needed help?

A satisfactory answer depended upon the staff operating one
step ahead of those who came for assistance.

Recognizing the

importance of trust as a prerequisite for effective communication.
Center staff talked about their recent struggles to learn.

Tutors

who gained the confidence of a child in trouble at school created an
atmosphere of hope and positive direction which proved effective
despite a lack of resources and professional training.
side, tutors often learned a great deal.

On the other

As they talked to the tutees

they discovered that difficulty with learning often sprang

For a discussion of the role of extrinsic and intrinsic rewards,
see Douglas McGregor, The Professional Manager (New York: McGrawHill, 1967), especially Chapter I.
8.
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from insensitive teachers.

Hie idea of self help was
as simple and as complex
as anything
about the Center.
The staff had to arouse hope
and motivation-an

illusion of power.

Then, students who thought they
could not learn

and tutors who thought they
could not teach would have a
chance to
discover their power to help
themselves and others.
For black males
to admit they could not read
meant admitting stupidity and failure.

Self help allowed tutors and staff
to tell of their own hang ups,
fears and failures and build trust.

They saw themselves as being

in the process of overcoming those
difficulties.

By emphasizing

change, Westside helped create an atmosphere
of hope which won an

indispensable motivation.

Also self help depended upon a staff which ranged
from youth
aides holding their first jobs to component
coordinators who had

considerable experience but lacked college diplomas for a
professional
position.

The staff

— including

coordinators and most aides
return.

the director, associate director,

were either in school or planning to

The Center used ideas of New Careers and paraprof essionals

before the terms became known.

Unless the staff was helping itself

to learn and helping itself by advancing from aide to assistant and

from coordinator to well-paying jobs in industry, that staff could

scarcely sell the concept of self help to others.

9.
See Frank Riessman and Arthur Pearl, New Careers for the Poor
The Nonprofessional in Human Services (New York: Free Press, 1965) and
Robert Reiff and Frank Riessman, "The Indigenous Nonprofessional: A
strategy of Change in Community Action and Community Mental Health
Programs," Community Mental Health Journal Monograph Series, 1965.
:
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Hie resulting turnover of
stuff and the many hours
devoted to
on the job training as well
as part-time classes
sometimes produced
a frustrating confusion about
the internal administration
of the Center
But that inefficiency was more
than compensated for by the
Center’s
rapport with people who came to it
for help because they feared
the

bureaucratic procedure of other agencies.

In addition to its own

staff, Westside provided training
opportunities for many Neighborhood

Youth Corps aides.

While they lacked experience in typing
and running

a telephone switchboard, they knew
about poverty and the need for

self help programs.
The contrast with established welfare
and service agencies

went further than an atmosphere of openness.
that their clients lacked power.

Most agencies assumed

The first reaction, and often the

last, of such white-dominated groups as the
Chamber of Commerce or

the American Friends Service Committee was to
call for a new

survey.

Their help came in the form of current statistics
about the

age of housing, the incidence of arrests, or the bitterness
expressed

by unemployed workers.

By implication, Blacks and poor people could

not even grasp their own plight.

Thus, any alleviation must come

from the established power blocs, who would

— presumably — mend

their

ways when told about the extent of deprivation and discrimination.
As a result, most official agencies fostered and supported

one of the damaging aspects of a typical ghetto pathology.

Repeated

frustrations created a helplessness and anger which turned many

black youths against trying to make it.

Why struggle in a system

15

which prevented success and which
could not be destroyed?

Before
people could put their energies and
thoughts into learning to read
or holding a meaningful job, they had
to see some chance to win, some

avenue through which they could get ahead.

Without a vision of

possible control over their own future, self
help was meaningless.
Yet most agencies, most police officers, most
welfare workers, most

church groups, most city officials, most school
teachers in Pasadena

implied in their tone and their actions that Blacks
could not control
their own lives without assistance from a white world
which was

paternalistic at best and often hostile. 10
Self help, when supported with enough tutoring,
enough

counseling, and enough encouragement so that individuals
could see
some positive accomplishments, worked to change both actions
and

attitudes.

As the Director commented in an early interview in the

Independent Star-News

,

"We have been able to see people start to help

themselves and when they do this they are no longer so-called indigent
people; they are no longer in a poverty state.

direction." 11

They have a point of

In personal terms, the changes were often dramatic.

A youth who often expressed bitterness and anger at conditions became

For useful descriptions of a ghetto pathology, see Paul
10.
Jacobs, Prelude to Riot (New York: Random House, 1968, 1968); Kenneth
B. Clark, Dark Ghetto (New York:
Harper and Row, 1965); and Kenneth
B. Clark and Jeanette Hopkins, A Relevant War Against Poverty (New
York:
Harper and Row, 1969).
11.

files

Pasadena Independent Star-News

,

October, 1966, in personal
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interested and concerned while tutoring
a third grader with reading
or spelling.

Thus self help, a traditional American
ideal for the white

population, became a key ingredient in the
black revolution of the
1960’s.

As James Farmer summed up the experiences
of the Civil

Rights Movement:

"The masses of Negroes who are now involved in
the

movement have achieved a measure of spiritual emancipation
with which

Lincoln

s

Proclamation could not possibly have endowed them."

The

key toward overcoming "the Negro sense of inferiority" and
gaining a

sense of legitimate identity lay "only in the midst of purposive
and

realistic effort in America."

By sitting in lunch rooms and by boy-

cotting stores and enduring a thousand humiliations to little children,
Southern Blacks gained dignity and pride which did not result from a
Supreme Court order.
The idea of black self help played an important part in the

thinking of nationalist groups such as the Muslims or US.

Without

money and the resources for major changes, black organizations had to
establish their identity in terms of a different life style and
different cultural norms.

Even more strongly than civil rights groups,

nationalist organizations emphasized their reliance upon black
supporters.

Westside Study Center, operating in the conservative

and middle class society of Pasadena, gave its own twist to self

12.
p. 80.

James Farmer, Freedom When ? (New York:

Random House),
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help.

But the idea and ideal provided
a common meeting ground
such

that both civil rights groups and
nationalists remained friendly

toward Westside and its goals. 13
Indeed, so essential was the
idea of self-help to the Black
community in the mid-1960's that
another organisation in Los Angeles
paralleled Westside's course in many
respects.
Founded by Lou Smith,
Bob Hall, and Bob Bailey,
"Operation Bootstrap" began in October
1965
in South Central Los Angeles.
Initially, "Bootstrap" focused on
job

training.

The organizers asked for borrowed
space and equipment and

encouraged volunteers to offer instruction
on various machines and in
various skills.

Self help made such pragmatic and ad
hoc arrangements

not easy but workable.

Soon "Bootstrap" included a variety of educa-

tional and community relations programs in part
because they supplemented
job training and in part because they represented
interests of some

volunteers.
The important thing, Bob Smith emphasized, was not programs
per
se, but a change in attitude among participants.

By attempting to

13.
See also Anthony Lewis, Portrait of a Decade (New York:
Bantam Books, 1965), especially chapter 6 on non-violent direct
action.
For example E.U. Essien-Udom in Black Nationalism (New
York:
Dell Publishing Co., Inc., 1962), p.360, described the
Muslim approach as follows: "Substantive freedom, a people's style
of life-material, cultural, moral and a sense of human dignity—
cannot be bestowed upon people who do not want it, and if they do,
are not prepared to help themselves and make the sacrifice necessary
lor its attainment; they must help create the conditions for it."
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improve conditions for people in
South Central Los Angeles,
Smith
thought, "we're opening up new
lines of communication; we're
forcing
people to talk to each other-people
from different economic levelsto get them to understand that
there are other kinds of people
and

that each one has something to offer
to the other."

Self help and its

related changes in attitudes established
a common ground for starting
such communication. 14

Yet the strategy of organizing
the Westside Study Center

around the idea of self help also
involved two sorts of problems which
were not typical of most community
action agencies and which often pro-

duced internal tensions.

Because no one at Westside could admit
to

failure, the Center often worked with
hard core persons who had few

connections to the world of steady work and
a legal income.
least part of the staff had to maintain
familiarity with
of hot goods, marijuana and pill peddling, and
much more.

a

Thus at

street life
At the

same time, if the staff succeeded in helping itself,
the Center had to
grow and take on larger and more difficult tasks.

Those tasks

involved connections with city officials and local business men who
often expected an appearance of efficiency and respectability.
The pressure for growth came from several directions.

Since

racism had a pervasive impact upon the lives of Blacks, a serious effort

14.
Bob Bailey and Lou Smith, "Operation Bootstrap" (an
interview conducted by Hallock Hoffman) Center Diary: lj6 (publication
of the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions by The Fund
for the Republic, Inc., Santa Barbara, Calif.), January-February 1967,
,

p. 38.
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to overcome discrimination required
an attack at many levels.

Tutoring
might encourage enough learning
to pass another grade and
eventually
to complete high school.
Still, many young Blacks with high
school
diplomas could not find any work, much
less an open ended job.

Different persons had different criteria
for success.

A major dis-

couragement in one area often destroyed a
lot of assistance and

motivation in other areas.
In addition to that pressure to help in
different ways people

who came to the Study Center, the staff wanted
to expand its own skills
and impact.

If basic encounter sessions heightened
racial awareness and

perceptions for small groups in Pasadena, perhaps
that method could

work for a major manufacturer.

If line foremen and middle management

became aware of the feelings and perceptions of new black
employees,
then Blacks would find it easier to hold jobs with advancement

possibilities, and the general employment picture might improve. 15

Always there was the search for more money and more staff to do more
things and make a greater change in Pasadena.

By involving school

teachers and other members of the black middle class, Westside

15.
Westside Study Center staff started encounter sessions for
businessmen as the result of early program experiences in job development and community forums. Businesses hiring hard core employees found
Westside' s techniques valuable.
In 1968 Westside staff participated
in seminars on sensitivity techniques at Richard Farson's Western
Behavioral Sciences Institute and the Center contracted its services
in basic encounter to the Human Development Institute in Atlanta,

Georgia.
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substantially moved to unite the poverty youths
and the established

middle class Blacks who shared Pasadena's ghetto.
The pressure for expansion led to a growth
during three

difficult and exciting years from a weekend tutoring
service to a
full scale community action agency.

That growth, that involvement

in the real problems and real people of Pasadena,
helped to create

an excitement about Westside which made itself felt to
everyone who
came.

People associated with the Center recalled a hundred stories

and incidents to illustrate and convey that charisma.
a Caltech professor happily tutored

For example

kids— although he might easily

have earned more than $1,000 per day by consulting in his field.
Everyone remembered the day the summer program set up a free tour of

Marineland for one bus load of children and then sent two buses and a
station wagon.

The calvacade waited at the gate until Marineland
i

decided it would rather admit everyone than choose which bus to
send back.
But no story in print conveyed the flavor of people doing

things which they wanted to do but had been afraid to try.

It was

arranging for a young Black spokesman from US to talk circles around
Caltech professors, not so much to demonstrate militancy as to prove
that a Ph.D. did not bring expertise in all areas.

It was non-

qualified people and a non-supported organization trying things and
succeeding.
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4.

Westside's Staff— "Young, Gifted and Black"

Westside Study Center could not have succeeded
without its
staff which combined a career ladder, a substantial
loyalty to
the idea of self help, and a dedication to making
Westside work.

In

a typical day, everyone on the staff was both training
others and

being trained himself.

Each job combined the challenge of new, untried

tasks and the consolidation of experience; each task combined
learning

and teaching.

A staff member had to play many roles, being personal

and professional to a wide variety of people within one day, adopting

"different strokes for different folks. "16

Walking into Westside, one might have found such a combination
of people as teenage girls working as Neighborhood Youth Corps aides,

members of the directing staff engaged in everything from professional

counseling to sealing envelopes, mothers from the community tutoring
children, Caltech professors moving furniture, and a wealthy matron
from the Board of Directors filing papers.

permeates the Center," a reporter noted.

"A spirit of enthusiasm
"It is fun to be there, and

the seriousness of purpose never quite crowds out the clubhouse

atmosphere."

Since everyone from time to time tackled tasks beyond their

imagined capabilities, since everyone could make mistakes and did,

Westside people shared a special trust and togetherness.
Larsuel said, "There's a groovy interchange.

Lionel

Every level of the

Popular song "Everyday People," by Sly and the Family Stone,
subtitle from a dramatic work by Lorraine Hansberry.
16.
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community is there, from the richest
to the poorest, trying to make
opportunities for [people].

That’s what makes it meaningful. "17

The sense of fun and capacity
for hard work among the staff

was illustrated by the story of the
making of the film "Black Anger"
for the Human Development Institute
(HDI) in Atlanta, Georgia, a

subsidiary of Bell and Howell. 18

in

Spring, 1968, the Director of

Westside was contacted by HDI while he and
the Job Development
Coordinator were in Washington on a fund-raising
trip.

He telephoned

Westside telling the staff to take a plane to
Atlanta the next day.
He asked Lionel Larsuel, Jack Allen, Tommy Moore
and Don Porter
top level coordinators, to come.

his

He also asked John "Junior Boy"

White, an ex gang leader, one of Westside’s hard core
staff who was

rising in the ranks to an assistant coordinator’s position.
The excitement about the trip is explained on many levels,
the telephone call gave little time to plan or worry. It was the

first time Westside was called upon to demonstrate its charisma

nation-wide in a large group. For most of the staff it was their first
trip to the deep South.

For John White, in particular, it was his

first exposure to the world of businessmen and jet planes

— it

was, in

fact, his first ride on a plane.

Before leaving, the staff outfitted John White from their own

17.

Pasadena Independent Star-News

18.

See film "Black Anger" in the official files of the Director.

,

February 23, 1968.

23

pockets with the clothing needed to
complement the Westside Study

Center Jackets— deep maroon jackets with
the emblem of the Center on
the pocket; an hour glass and the words
"Time is running out."

The

jackets were proudly worn by staff at Westside
who held positions of

responsibility and had demonstrated their loyalty
to the Center.

It

was indicative of the importance of the trip that John
put on the

uniform with the rest, and that they made sure he was
able to portray
the Westside image.

He also obtained an attache case, a symbol, in a

sense, of his new image of responsibility.

Everyone boarded the plane with mixed feelings of excitement
and anticipation.

They were about to enter Westside in a significant

competition, they were about to make a film, and they were going to

Atlanta for the first time.

When the plane took off, Junior Boy

held on to the seat for dear life, a seat he could have pulled loose

with his size and strength.
When the group arrived in Atlanta they shared many funny and
frightening experiences traveling around the city.

Two weeks earlier,

Martin Luther King had been assassinated in Memphis.

A group of young

black males, traveling together in matching jackets, communicating
unity and fun, were a strange sight to Atlantans.
they were asked, "Do you sing?"

At several restaurants

The group was aware of the irony of

the image they portrayed, given people's prejudices and expectations.
The Westside staff was not there to sing, but they were there
to make a movie depicting black rage.

Their role was to convey to

whites the black experience, by their image and their words, so that
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communication could take place
about white attitudes and
perceptions.
At HDI, John White took on the
role of the Director's eyes
and ears.

He sized up what he was there
for, he figured out the

"rules," and he made sure everyone
else in the group stuck to the
rules.

By the time he got on the plane
to return, John White was a

"professional."

He sat down on the plane,
coolly opened up his attache

case, and proceeded to read his
papers.

After the Atlanta experience, John
White was never the same.
He was no longer programmed for
jail; he had different needs.

He had

had a taste of another world, a world larger
than the few square
blocks he had ruled in Pasadena.
larger world he had glimpsed.

He wanted a share of success in the

Soon after the Atlanta trip, he became

Assistant Coordinator for Job Development at Westside.
For the rest of the staff, the experience was not so
much

totally new as the first opportunity to compete on a national
level.
As a part of their national campaign to hire more minority workers

,

the

National Alliance of Businessmen had contracted with Human Development
Institute to make a film to sensitize middle management to minority
workers.

To make the film, "Black Anger," HDI had invited five

groups of black young men from Los Angeles, Roxbury, Chicago, Detroit,
and Philadelphia.

For Westside* s staff, making the film was an opportunity to

demonstrate skills they had learned at Westside in encounter group
techniques and in developing jobs.

Also they had a chance to express

some of their own frustrations and those of others, revealed
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in tutoring and counseling hard
core unemployed adults.
If successful, Westside's
part in making the film and

competing for the contract would offer
the opportunity for national

exposure and would open new doors in
funding.

In the offing was the

possibility of a sub-contract to direct
other programs in HDI's
sensitivity training.
No one on the staff had the traditional
credentials of a

professional, the B.A. degree.

At age thirty, Jack Allen, Head of

Community Services, and the oldest coordinator,
was a junior at Cal
State, Los Angeles.

Assistant Director, Lionel Larsuel, age twenty-

six, had tried college programs three different
times, each time

meeting with typical frustrations and "turned off before
being turned
out."

Obviously bright and articulate, Larsuel had found in Westside

a chance to use his talents and to realize his concern for alienated

black youth.

Both Don Porter, in charge of public relations, and

Tommy Moore, educational component director, managed to combine a

heavy load of classes at California State College at Los Angeles with
raising families and directing their components at Westside.

The

Director, himself, completed his bachelors degree concurrently with

his responsibilities at Westside.
Young, ambitious and talented Blacks, Westside staff "stole the
show" by working together in the film "Black Anger."

They remembered

the serious purpose of the film and its possible consequences for them,

but they knew how to break the tension and not to be too up tight about
the possibility of failure.

What they were doing was not only new but
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supposedly impossible.
Although Westside combined the
experience and supportive

assistance which opened doors for John
White and others, sometimes

Westside could not counteract the impact
of a pervasive system of
distrusts, discrimination, and deprivation.
on the staff,

for example, ended in jail.

One of John White’s friends

Called Duke in one

sociological study, he illustrated the effects
in personal terms of
a society which left bright, active youths
without access to legitimate,

respectable paths for advancement.

Although those standard examples

used to illustrate the pathology of ghetto life
have created a

skewed impression, Duke's case did represent a possibility
open to
many others, for the escape from jail was often narrow.^
Born in 1948, Duke never experienced a stable family life
whi-C-h

he could both emulate and draw upon for support in dealing

with school and classmates.

His mother, unmarried, had arrived from

Arkansas shortly before his birth.
older half-sister.

He had a younger half-brother and

His natural father had lived in the Northwest

Pasadena area and had provided some support for Duke, first under
court order and later voluntarily.
him, but spent little time with him.

Duke knew his father and liked
The three most influential

members of his family were his mother, his maternal grandmother, and
his maternal great grandmother, with whom he lived.
Duke's mother, grandmother, and great grandmother worked as

Pat Sutton, "Duke:
case study).
19.

A Study in Deviance," (an unpublished

27

domestics from the time he was
a small child, and they
had never been
on welfare. "Cousins" in the
neighborhood looked after him
when he
was younger and Duke returned
from school to an empty house.
He often
defended his younger half-brother,
a high school drop out on
probation
whose problems troubled him, and
his sister, who attended business
college and worked in an office.

Although kept in schohl for
twelve years, Duke could barely
read
a newspaper.
He had no skills readily sellable
on the job market,
and his physical strengths had little
value in a day of machines.
At the age of thirteen he had his first formal
confrontation with
the police.

His arrest record included marijuana
possession, destruction

of property, suspicion of robbery, and an
alleged assault on a police

officer; and he had been tried for attempted murder.

Duke recognized

his problem with his temper and that he quickly leaped
to the support
of his friends.

He felt a gun was a necessary protection.

Duke spent his leisure time in hustling
in the terms defined by the middle class.

— he

never held a job

For a time he was paid by

the police to act as a control on the behavior of his friends.

He was

viewed by the police as a "ring leader" and by his Juvenile Probation

Officer as a "unique guy" and a "natural leader."
Duke came to the Westside Study Center with the help of a

"cousin," a respected businessman in the Negro community.

He became

a community relations assistant at the Center in November, 1967.

The

job, which paid $1.50 an hour, four hours a day, was the first time

he had worked where he was expected to be some place on time to do
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certain specified things.
His job involved him with the
police and the courts in a new
way.

Parents of young people arrested in
the area would call the

Study Center, and the Duke among others
would go to jail and to the

police to talk to and about the prisoner
and his alleged offense.

In

the case of juveniles, he would go to court
with the youngster and

tell the judge the results of the investigation
he had made regarding
the boy s friends, his contacts in the community,
and the possibility
of his staying out of trouble in the future. Often, the
juvenile courts

would release the boy into Westside's custody.
Duke took pride in actually changing judge’s minds about
the

disposition of a youngster.
like a lawyer.

Duke and others like him learned to talk

In the case of young adults, Duke would make a

similar report to the lawyer who was going to take the case.
Center had five attorneys who took cases).

(The

In addition, Duke made

a financial investigation of the client and recommended to the attorney

how much should be charged, based on ability to pay.

Duke was proud

that the lawyer would believe him and base the fees on his recom-

mendation.
In spite of his competence and usefulness at Westside, Duke's

troubles with the police did not end.

previous behavior pursued him.

His reputation, friends, and

In 1968 Duke was arrested and convicted

and is now serving a sentence of five years to life.

Pasadena’s Dukes demonstrated the need for Westside Study
Center.

It's failures and successes had to be measured by the
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difficulty of the task and the effort
involved.

By what standards

could one compare John White's
story with that of his friend.
Duke?

Westside had a staff that could
reach people like John White
and Duke, whose lives were balanced
precariously between success and
defeat.

They could empathize because they
had been abandoned by public

institutions and white society.

In Westside, they mobilized
their

talents and frustrations— making a film,
tutoring children, raising

money, speaking in court, running encounter
sessions.

Young, gifted

and Black, their successes proved the waste
and neglect perpetrated

by a racist society.

CHAPTER
PASADENA

II

A CASE OF URBAN NEGLECT

Westside Study Center made no
sense except as a response
to
Pasadena's persistent failure
to provide equal education
and opportunity
for its poor and minority citizens.
As Jack Allen, coordinator
of

community services, told a local
newspaper reporter, no one at
Westside
wanted a permanent organization.
"There should not have to be a
Westside Study Center," he added.
1
If the Pasadena Unified School
District had provided meaningful
education, if local business firms
had employed qualified minority workers,
if the city had made its

Northwest region feel a part of

a larger

community rather than ghetto,

then Westside would not have existed.

The facts about the ghetto— defined by a
lack of power and

money relative to the rest of Pasadena-Altadena-were
on the one hand,
clear enough.

In the area around the Center, about three
persons in

four were Black and one in six Caucasian.

had an income of less than $5,000 per year.

Three in five households
Three families in ten fell

below the officially defined "poverty level" in 1966.

For children,

the chances of experiencing poverty were higher, since two thirds of

the families (145 in one survey) with five or more children were in
the poverty category.

About one in five families depended upon some

The Pasadena Independent Star-News series on the Westside
1.
Study Center, February 23, 1968, p. A-l.
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2

form of public assistance (See Figure
1).

One in four in the nineteen

to sixty-five age bracket reported
themselves unemployed.

adults had not finished high school.

Two in five

No minority person had held an

elective office in the city or school
district.
Few Pasadenans outside the Northwest
area, on the other hand,

recognized a problem.

At least they had seen little reason for
concern

prior to the 1965 rioting in South Central Los
Angeles.

Most white

Pasadenans did not know where Watts was, and they
certainly would

have denied— had the thought occurred— that Pasadena had
a growing ghetto
along North Fair Oaks Avenue.

They were far more aware of the denial

of civil rights in Birmingham, Bogalusa, and Selma than of
discrimina-

tion in Watts, Compton or Pasadena.

Making the Westside Study Center work depended upon a clear
sense of reality; more precisely, it required a flexible understanding
of the realities perceived by many different groups and a skill in

communicating across those barriers thrown up by different perceptions.
First, the Westside staff had to know and accept the inarticulated
fears, impressions, reactions, and hopes of the people living in

Northwest Pasadena.

Second, the staff had to negotiate with the

2.
See "Neighborhood Social Diagnostic Survey," prepared in
cooperation with the Community Redevelopment Agency of Pasadena, April
1967.
Figures are based on fire census tracts with a 1960 population
of 27,328 along North Fair Oaks Avenue

See Jerry Cohen and William S. Murphy, Burn
3.
The Watts Riot (New York: Avon Books, 1966), p.12.

,

Baby

,

Burn

!
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established powers of the city who seldom
recognised the existence
of a relatively deprived community in
Northwest Pasadena.

How

could Westside encourage practical remedies
from a city which did

not want to see or understand the condition
of thousands of Blacks?

There was indeed a thick sheet of plate
glass between the

Blacks and the white majority; as W.E.B. DuBois has
eloquently
described:
It is difficult to let others see the full psychological
meaning of caste segregation. It is as though one,
looking out
from a dark cave in a side of an impending mountain,
sees the
world passing and speaks to it.
One talks on evenly and
logically in this way but notices that the passing throng does
not even turn its head, or if it does, glances curiously and
walks on.
It gradually penetrates the minds of the prisoners
that the people passing do not hear; that some thick sheet of
invisible but horribly tangible plate glass is between them and
the world.
.

.

.

Thus affluent white Americans had effectively filtered out sounds of

protest from frustrated Blacks who endured discrimination and deprivation.

By the 1960’s Pasadena presented a classic case of urban

neglect.

A majority of voters saw no problem with their city.

Mean-

while housing and public services deteriorated in the Northwest area
and schools with a large black population taught less and often spent
less.

Pasadena changed from a white, middle class residential

community into a city much more typical of urban America.

W.E.B. DuBois, Dusk of Dawn (1940), pp. 130-131, as cited in
4.
Gunnar Myrdal, An American Dilemma (New York: McGraw-Hill Book
Company, 1964), p. 680.
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1*

Pasadena— The Crown City

Pasadena, home of the California
Institute of Technology and
the Rose Bowl, was by 1960 a
city with a favorable
reputation and with
little willingness to examine its
worsening public services and
prospects. Dominated by white, wealthy,
self-satisfied property owners,

Pasadena had a rapidly growing black
population.

Attracted by pleasant

residential streets, available housing
in the older Northwest area,

and new openings for unskilled labor in the
electronics industries,
Negroes had moved to Pasadena from the South
and from central Los
Angeles.

Blacks made up one in twelve Pasadenans
in 1950, one in

eight in 1960, and more than one in five in
1969.

Yet those citizens

scarcely counted when outsiders associated Pasadena
with little old
ladies in tennis shoes, magnificent parades, and
good schools.
In I960, as in 1950, Pasadena was by and large
controlled by

a combination of old families and downtown merchants who ran
the city

unofficially through considerable informal agreement and the support of
the two local papers.

Rather unconsciously, residents spoke about

Pasadena as a united and active community when
small group of men.

ttey

actually meant a

As the reporter David Hulburd had noted in 1952,

"Pasadena, with its traditionally conservative background, was (and

still is) dominated, in the main, by a group of influential downtowners,

most of them with big real-estate interests, whose social center was a
place called the Overland Club and who pulled a great many strings
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in the operation of the city." 5

Civic pride was fostered by
the international fame
of its
New Year's Day celebration, by
its department stores
which attracted
shoppers from the western end of the
San Gabriel Valley, by the

Pasadena Playhouse, by a much-used
public library system, and by a
highly- regarded City College. Looking

north— on smogless days,

residents saw the Mount Wilson Observatory.

Just to the east in

Arcadia, racing took place at the Santa
Anita track.

A few blocks

south in San Marino stood the famed
Huntington Library and Gardens.
TVo newspapers, the Star-News and the
Independent

,

regularly supported

"Downtown Pasadena," the Chamber of Commerce,
the Tournament of
Roses Association, as well as the largest
silent partner in Pasadena's

progress— the California Institute of Technology and its
off spring,
the Jet Propulsion Laboratory.

The traditional power groups in Pasadena clung to its
reputation
as a good place to live.

In 1939, a major study had ranked Pasadena

first among American cities in "General Goodness of Life."

Then,

a winter resort and retirement community, Pasadena had many orange

groves which added an air of rural space to its many urban advantages.

Its natural beauty and pleasant climate encouraged people to live

there who could support civic enterprises as well as many privately

supplied amenities.

Connected with Los Angeles by street railway

5.
David Hulburd, This Happened in Pasadena (New York:
Macmillan Company, 1951), p.119.

The
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or a long drive, Pasadena had
not yet lost Its distinctness
In the
smog and general sprawl of Los
Angeles.
But Pasadena could
not long remain
unaffected hy the enormous
growth of population and
industry in the Los
Angeles basin during
and after World War II.
With the opening of the
Pasadena Freeway
in 1940, many persons had
built homes in the orange
groves and vacant
land in eastern Pasadena and
Altadena. That influx of
population,
nearly all white and employed
in middle class jobs in
Pasadena or
Los Angeles, generally acquiesced
to the government both
formal and

informal of the old "Downtowner”
group, although their interests
more
resembled those of their suburban
neighbors in Arcadia and Glendale.

Most things which Pasadenans pointed
to with pride depended
largely upon the organized, but
voluntary, support of businessmen
and philanthropists.

Caltech, the Huntington Library, the
Art

Museum, and the fast-growing Ambassador
College testified to the

wealth of contributors.

The Tournament of Roses Association,
the

Foothill's Community Chest drive, the Pasadena
Beautiful Association

relied upon the organized good will of citizens.

Pasadena's

Congressional representative, H. Allen Smith, represented
well the

conservative and anti-federal biases of his constituents.

While

periodically capable of reactionary diversions, few white
residents

6.
See Dr. Edward L. Thorndyke, Your City
Also see Robert W.
Oliver, An Eco nomic Survey of the City of Pasadena (Pasadena,
California:
The Pasadena Chamber of Commerce, Hay 1959), p.39.
.
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had any serious complaints about their city
in 1960.
Nevertheless, the bases for conflict had existed
for more
than a decade.

The Downtowners with real estate interests
as well

as homeowners disliked any public service which
threatened a rise in

property taxes.

Thus, as Hulburd had noted, "much as they welcomed

new industry as a means of bringing in new revenue,
they abhor ed
the social changes new industries create

— particularly

the influx of

nonwhites who must be housed, fed, their children educated, and

absorbed into the community "7
.

No longer simply a winter resort for the wealthy and the

retired and yet more than a bedroom suburb for Los Angeles, Pasadena

confronted contemporary urban life with a tradition and an entrenched
ruling group peculiarly unable to meet the city's problems.
In 1959 Pasadena had a minority population concentrated along

Fair Oaks Avenue.

Twenty years earlier there were about 3,000

Negroes in a population of 75,000 living in "established communities
of servants of the rich."

When other Negroes moved in after World

War II they joined those pockets strung out along Fair Oaks Avenue,
in the valley below the big estates along Orange Grove Avenue (the

street shown on television for the Rose Parade)

.

noted in 1950, the area was "hardly substandard.
called a slum."®

7.

Hulburd, This Happened in Pasadena , p.120.

8.

Hulburd, This Happened in Pasadena , p.9.

As Hulburd had
It could never be
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Indeed, Pasadena attracted many middle
class Blacks from

central Los Angeles.

As a past board member of the
local chapter of

the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored Peoples

commented:

Negroes found in Pasadena

M

a good middle class community

with a sizeable segment of fairly affluent
black people.
nice community in which to live and it had good
schools."
cases the new residents worked in Los Angeles.

husband and wife held jobs.
place for their families.

It was a

In most

Typically, both

They hoped Pasadena would prove a good
They worked hard, shopped in Los Angeles

carefully cared for their homes, and avoided public activities
in the
city.

That pattern contributed to the general "invisibility" of

Pasadena’s black citizens for many years.
Certainly white Pasadena had a difficult time recognizing
any difference in their city as a result of growing minority population.
As early as 1950, the presence of minority group pupils had started

affecting Pasadena's schools, but not in major ways.

In 1948, the

Board of Education had hired a new Superintendent, Willard Goslin,
then president of the American Association of School Administrators.

Thirty months later the Board requested Goslin' s resignation.

Most

opposition rested upon charges of progressive education by persons

who identified Karl Marx, John Dewey, and Joseph Stalin as enemies
of their way of life.

Yet one factor in an overwhelming defeat of a

tax increase measure came from opposition in areas which feared new

Comment cited in Dorothy Townsend, "Pasadena's Crown City
Image Tarnished," Los Angeles Times , Section B, April 27, 1969.
9.
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school boundaries would place them in
a district with Blacks.
As
the President of the Realty Board
delicately phrased his objections;
"the proposed change in toning will
have a definite effect on
property
.'*10
values
The Goslin controversy and the subsequent
defeat of the tax

increase foreshadowed the conflicts which would
paralyze effective

action in Pasadena as it changed from a homogenous
population to a
city of conflicting interest groups:
class versus poor; Black versus white.

retired versus young; middle-

Wealthy civic leaders pulled

out in dismay as Pasadena rapidly took on the characteristics
of

modern urban dilemmas.

When people shared many interests— of ten true in white
middle-class suburbs

almost any political organization could obtain

consensus upon the quality and allocation of such services as fire
and police protection, water and sewage lines, schools and recrea-

tional facilities.

But no government system has worked well to

compromise opposing wants.

And as a result, modern cities have built

public enterprises through various expedients

:

charismatic leader-

ship, civic corruption, major propaganda campaigns, or political log-

rolling among elected representatives of interest groups.

Undoubtedly

those expedients have not successfully overcome a persistent

tendency toward under-allocation of publically-financed goods and

10.

Hulburd, This Happened in Pasadena

,

p.80.

40

services

.

In one sense, cities have urban
problems precisely because

their heterogeneous populations have
such diverse interests as to
make public services a source of
conflict rather than civic consensus.

Business men desire zoning requirements
and street patterns different
from those sought by residents. Young
families want more parks,
schools, libraries, and recreational
programs for children than do

retired workers.

In the United States, such class
and economic

differences have been compounded by a pervasive
white racism. 12
Pasadena had some distinct advantages, however,
for creating
support from a majority of tax payers for civic
services.
tax base meant a low tax rate.

A large

The city collected substantial income

from a sales tax paid in part by non-residents who
shopped there.
The city spent more than twenty-five times more for police
protection
than for welfare.

expenditures.)

(See Figure 2 for a breakdown of taxes, and

But Pasadena's tradition of civic leadership had

never included its black citizens

— middle-class

or poor.

The dialogue

11.
For an economist's approach to collective activities, see
Mancur Olson, Jr., The Logic of Collectiv e Action: Public Goods and
the Theory of Groups (New York: Schocken, 1968).
For the point
about under-allocation of resources for public services is made most
clearly in Anthony Downs, "Why the Government Budget Is Too Small in
a Democracy," in Public Wants and Public Needs edited by Edmund S.
Phelps (New York: Norton, 1962), pp. 76-95.
,

12
Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil
Disorders (New York: Bantam Books, 1968), p.10.
.
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UTILITY

CONTRIBUTIONS
METROPOLITAN WATER
DISTRICT FOR WATER
BOND SERVICE

total income
$ 9,

source

:

pasaoewa city controller, annual report

,

305 943.90
,

isst- itse.

FIG. 2

GENERAL INCOME AND EXPENDITURES FOR
THE CITY OF PASADENA
Fiscal Year 1957-1958
(Exxept Improvement Bond Funds)
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that might have preceded effective
compromise never reached across

racial lines.

2.

Pasadena’s Discovery of a Housing Problem

In 1958, The Pasadena Chamber of
Commerce contracted with the

Stanford Research Institute for a social and
economic survey.

By

then, many businessmen recognized signs of
change in their city.

the SRI report noted:

’’Pasadena is a city in transition.

As

It is,

however, a city which has the potential to deal
successfully with
three major problems:

a shortage of land, growing obsolescence in

certain residential and commercial areas, and the increasing
number
of low income families in the older part of the City.” 13

Phrased

more bluntly, vacant lands, new residences, and new
industries on the
east side no longer assured prosperity to the city.

Older areas

on the west side attracted lower income and minority
groups who

required a different kind of public service than Pasadena had pre-

viously provided.
Although the author of the report shared many liberal
attitudes, Robert Oliver had no positive suggestions for Pasadena’s

business community which would at the same time help the people
living in the Northwest community.

Unable to confront directly the

issue of most Pasadenan’s commitment to maintaining a white community,

Oliver phrased the change mainly in terms of housing:

13.

Oliver, An Economic Survey

,

p.5.

"The prime
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symptom of residential obsolescence is that low-income
families
and individuals now live where middle- income families
used to live.

Middle income and high-income families and individuals
are being
pushed farther away from the heart of Pasadena." 1 ^
As Oliver noted, most cities had difficulty
in halting the

shift from older residences to recognizable slum
conditions,

"it is

possible," he wrote, "that the strict enforcement
of health, sanitation,
and building codes and the enforcement of zoning
ordinances may prevent
the development of slums."

That possibility, however, ignored the

probability that older people and minorities would move
in.

"If the

people moving into the areas are not accustomed to maintaining
and

improving property, the deterioration is accelerated, blight is
likely, and slum conditions may follow. "1-5

And a slum offered little

economic incentive for renewal, which apparently meant the city should

discourage low income residents.

Accordingly, the solution for

obsolescent housing lay in enforcing housing codes and possibly a
community redevelopment agency.

(The possibility of seizing a chance

to cooperate in a viable integrated society was left unstated.)

That focus upon the age and condition of housing

— an

emphasis

which soothed qualms about mentioning the racial make-up of Northwest
Pasadena

— did

not encourage a recognition of poverty and discrimination.

Southern California slums were not crowded tenements but many blocks

14.

Oliver, An Economic Survey , p. 11.

15.

Oliver, An Economic Survey

,

p.

106.

of small frame and stucco dwellings crowded on small lots.

heat or cold seldom brought obvious physical discomfort.

Acute

Nor did

Pasadena's black population include many cases of hunger and disease
for those who demanded pathological conditions before recognizing a

problem.

As late as 1965, ostensibly liberal and concerned adults

denied that Pasadena had a ghetto, although they regularly drove along
Fair Oaks Avenue.

Unemployment, underemployment, moonlighting,

families with several breadwinners

— those

were the major manifestations

of the quiet struggle to survive and to get ahead.

Poverty became a problem long before it became the abject
condition that all too many citizens associated with slums.

In Pasadena,

poverty appeared in the lawns of dust and tufted Bermuda or wild rye
grass.

It appeared in the absence of fresh paint, adequate furnishings,

newspapers, magazines, and books.

Poverty meant rats and other rodents

and neighbors with similar problems.

It meant old cars, no cars, and

waiting for rare and slow public transportation.

It meant fewer public

services such as washing the streets and trimming roadside palms.

poverty

—which

But

lay behind the deteriorating housing described in

official reports

— did

not leap forth and proclaim itself.

That purposive confusion encouraged by labelling a problem as
to
"poor housing" while meaning "poor Blacks" passed mainly unnoticed

distinct
most white Pasadenans because the minority population lived in

property values
sections whose decline had little immediate effect upon
in east Pasadena.

Originally, Pasadena’s black population— mainly

domestics— lived near Orange Grove Avenue for the convenience
employers.

of thexr

Angeles increased,
As the Influx of black families from Los
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the unofficial policy of the city to ghettoize
the area around Fair

Oaks solidified.

Common practice among realtors, in conjunction
with the

mortgage policies of local banks, maintained first
Marengo, then
El Molino, and finally Lake Avenue as the eastern
boundary of the

visible ghetto.

The northern boundary progressively pushed north

into Altadena, the unincorporated county area between
Pasadena and
the mountains.

Some apologists explained residential discrimination

as a result of the lingering effect of restrictive covenants

—

common feature of deeds in Pasadena before the Supreme Court declared
them unenforceable.
such discrimination.

(Until 1969, the Board of Realtors had denied

At which point an officer announced that

realtors had "grown up, turned around completely."

For example, he

added, "If an owner today says don't show my house to Negroes, we

walk away from the listing. "^)
That geographical distribution, of course, made possible a

host of minor forms of public discrimination, although Pasadena had
experienced little difficulty about integrating the seating in movies
and maintaining a reasonably equal system of parks.

worried about the impact of a declining neighborhood

The major group which
was the merchants

along Colorado Boulevard who were already plagued by inadequate parking
spaces and old buildings.

They wanted to push the black neighborhood

further north, but they wanted to do it without a lot of publicity and

16.

Townsend, "Pasadena's Crown City Image Tarnished."
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without hurting Pasadena's reputation as

a good place to live and
to

shop.

From the point of view of downtown
businessmen and property
owners, the problem seemed peculiarly difficult.

If they ignored

Northwest Pasadena, the area might deteriorate
into

a slum.

If the city

government acted to keep up public services, if
the city banks and
real estate brokers encouraged Negroes to buy houses,
if schools

maintained quality education and integrated districts,
then they could
anticipate an accelerated trend toward black population.

White

Pasadenans were even less willing to consider that possibility.
Apparently, their optimum strategy lay in making life difficult for

Blacks while officially denying the existence of a ghetto or slum,

since such a belief might detract from Pasadena’s reputation and its
property values.
Such a strategy might have worked.

Most cities have consistently

provided worse services for black citizens than for whites.

Whether

planned or by accidental design, in the 1960's Pasadena shifted its
ghetto northward away from the central business district.

Through

various changes in zoning, through the Pepper Redevelopment Agency,
through the routing of the Foothill Freeway and extension of the Pasadena
Freeway, events combined to shift the center of Negro population north

of the new east-west freeway route.

Altadena became largely integrated,

though no one could tell if that were merely a transitional step.

Federally-financed redevelopment served as the instrument for

moving Blacks out of many central areas.

In January, 1961, Pasadena
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City Board of Directors devised a
plan called the Pepper
Project
to provide what seemed to be low
cost housing for poor
Blacks and

minority groups.

(See Figures 3 and 4.) From
that time, all

development on the land was halted by
law.

Homeowners, primarily

Blacks, could not renovate or privately
sell their homes, but had to
await the City’s "fair offer."
The plan was initially adopted under
Ordinance No. 4677 by the

Pasadena City Board of Directors on September
11, 1964, and was amended
in 1968.

In the interim period, primarily
1964-65, most of the land

was bought and immediately cleared, providing
residents with no

housing until the promised low-cost quality housing
would be completed. I?

Many private dwellings were acquired through eminent domain.
Four out of five lots were owner-occupied.

(See Figure 4.)

Most

of the homeless citizens, according to a special series in the

Pasadena Eagle ,

were forced to move into other ghetto areas or out of

the city entirely.

Eagle

,

The relocation problem was made worse, said the

by the low amounts paid for the property in relation to housing

costs elsewhere in the city. 18
In order that the project might qualify for federal assistance,

the plan was also devised to function as an Urban Renewal Plan.

A

federal grant of 3.88 million dollars was received towards the project.
The city was to contribute 1.43 million (But as of the spring of 1969,

18.
For a critical view of the Pepper Project see the series in
The Pasadena Eagle , April 19, May 17, June 1, June 14, July 6, 1968.
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an investigating team from the U.S. Department of Housing
and Urban

Development reported that no more federal funds would be
forthcoming
un til the city made

a first and significant payment."

run into anything like this before," a HUD agent said.

paraphrased him as saying.

"It could.

.

.

"We've never
A news reporter

shake up the whole theory

of federal-community cooperation in urban redevelopment. "19)

Building on the land began in 1969, eight years after the land

had been frozen and four to five years after the land had been cleared.
Only in 1970 were the first series of buildings completed.

In the

meantime, for eight years, business and home development had been

halted on lower Fair Oaks Avenue.

During that time, not surprisingly,

the center of the Black population moved northward and eastward.

Most of the inconsistencies in the Pepper Project's goals
and means were no mystery to ghetto residents.

As one study noted,

Pasadena's first and, so far, only redevelopment project had to

"contend with a mountain of suspicion on the part of the Negro.
But Blacks had no say in how the city ran its affairs; and for most

white residents of Pasadena, the critical issue was not obsolescence
of housing but the racial make-up of schools.

19.

Townsend, "Pasadena's Crown City Image Tarnished."

Ben Magubane and Anthony Ngubo, Report of the Pepper Area
20.
Research Project (Pasadena, California: American Friends Service
Committee, September 1965), p.l.
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3.

Schools Face Racial Imbalance

Plainly the quality of public schools made a difference to the

people who chose Pasadena for their home.

As early as 1963, for

example, one realtor estimated that rental properties earned
$500 more a year in the white Hamilton district than in the integrated

McKinley district although both neighborhoods were largely white
and close to Caltech.

In 1958, real property in Pasadena had an

assessed valuation of $318 million.

It was taxed $10.40 by the city

and $59.30 by the county per $1,000 of assessed value.

ceived $35.60 of the county tax
cities in California.

—a

The schools re-

characteristic figure for similar

Those taxes had maintained a first rate

school system.
In the 1958 report, Oliver had noted that "one of the strong

points of Pasadena was the relatively high level of education attained

by its citizens."

At that time, there were three school districts

with one board and one superintendent.

The elementary schools

included Pasadena, Altadena, and some unincorporated areas.

The high

school district added on La Canada and Sierra Madre, while the junior
college district went further to include Temple City.

In 1958,

twenty-seven elementary schools served about 15,000 pupils, seven

junior high schools held 8,000, two senior high schools served nearly
5,000 enrolled full-time and another 10,000 adults in various

extension programs.

Furthermore, Catholic schools enrolled about

4,800 students. 21Signs of trouble still lingered from the bruising fight over

21.

Oliver, An Economic Survey

,

p.87.
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Willard Goslin in 1950, but Oliver judged it "probable
that the
excellent national reputation which had been enjoyed by
Pasadena’s

school system prior to 1948’ s [would be] restored." As
evidence,

Oliver cited that in 1957 71.9 per cent of the graduating
class from
John Muir High School and 72.1 per cent from Pasadena High School

enrolled in a college or university.

In national tests Pasadena

placed 30.3 per cent of its students at or above the 90th percentile
level and 87.1 per cent at or above the 50th percentile.

The John

Muir High School, which ten years later would be the first high school
in Pasadena to have a majority of black students, enrolled nineteen

members of its graduating class of 1958 in Stanford University
(the largest number from any one high school, public or private,
in the United States). ^2

Nevertheless, some of the impact of white Pasadenans’ reluctance to send their children to school with black Pasadenans was

already apparent in 1958.

As Oliver had diplomatically noted, "In

the minds of some of the Pasadenans interviewed during this study,
the increase of minority races in Pasadena is causing a problem in

that wealthier families, particularly those with children, are leaving

those school districts having a preponderance of minority races."
For the next decade most white Pasadenans knew someone agonizing over
the decision to leave an integrated district for east Pasadena or
for a neighboring city.

22.

Generally they were correct in judging the

Oliver, An Economic Survey

,

p.90.
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quality of schools to be declining; and invariably
their decision to
move speeded up that process. 23
At that time, only Cleveland (81 per cent
Black), Garfield
(51 per cent)

,

Jackson (26 per cent)

,

Lincoln (66 per cent)

,

Madison

(26.5 per cent), and Washington (52.8 per cent) elementary
schools

enrolled more than twenty per cent Blacks.

Only three other elemen-

tary schools bore the name of a former President:

per cent Black), Jefferson

(7

Roosevelt (19.5

per cent), and McKinley (6.3 per cent).

Only Franklin, with 9.6 per cent, intervened in the roll call of

presidents among elementary schools with more than two per cent Black

Among six junior high schools, Washington with 45.6 per

children.

cent Negroes and Roosevelt with 24.1 per cent led the list.

Among

the three high schools in 1958, Continuation had 14.1 per cent,

John Muir had 13.7 per cent, and Pasadena High School (PHS) had 3.0
per cent. 24

(See Figures 5 and 6).

Although those numbers meant that most schools were integrated,

Pasadena presented a classic case of de facto segregation.

Three out

of four black children in Pasadena attended an elementary school in

which they were a majority.

At the same time, most white children

attended schools with no, or with less than one per cent, Blacks.

23.

Oliver, An Economic Survey

,

p.88.

Data taken from "Pasadena City Schools Racial and Ethnic
24.
Distribution of Enrollment," Pasadena Department of Research, Pasadena
City Schools, October 1966.
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Percentage of Negroes enrolled in schools by years
JUNIOR HIGH

ELEMENTARY

Cleveland (1)
Washington(2)
Lincoln (3)
Franklin (4)
Jackson(5)
Madison(6)
Edison(7)
Audubon (8)
Roosevelt (9)
Garfield(lO)
Loma Alta(ll)
Altadena(12)
McKinley (13)

1958-59

1963-64

1966

81.1
52.8
66.2
9.6
26.0
26.5
0.2
0.8
19.5
51.5

87.0
81.2
74.8
59.3
54.7
36.8
28.9
20.4
28.6
43.4

94.4
87.4
78.7
73.2
68.2
55.3
45.7
37.5
37.0
36.5
15.1
13.5
9.2

—

0.1
6.3

3.7

4.4
18.0

1958-59

1963-64

1966

67.1
21.2
9.7
14.6

71.1
19.5
18.4
18.2

Washington (a) * 45.6
8.7
McKinley (b)
Eliot(c)
Roosevelt (d)

0.2
24.1

SENIOR HIGH
1958-59

1963-64

1966

23.1

43.1
32.6
22.1

Continuation (I) 14.
13.7
Muir (II)
—
Blair(III)
*Key to location on map.

26.

21.8
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Figure 6

RACIAL AND ETHNIC DISTRIBUTION OF ENROLLMENT IN ELEMENTARY SCHOOL AREAS

Caucasian

Negro

1958-59

1963-64

Allendale (24)*

93.0%

87.8 %

87.2%

0.3%

0.2%

—

Altadena (12)

99.5

92.9

76.4

0.1

4.4

13.5

Arroyo Seco(25)

98.4

98.9

98.8

Audubon (8)

97.7

66.0

48.1

Burbank (20)

100.0

98.3

97.5

Cleveland(l)

1.8

0.8

1.9

Don Benito(17)

99.4

98.7

93.6

Edison(7)

98.0

64.9

46.5

Field(21)

94.0

94.5

91.3

Franklin (4)

76.9

24.5

13.9

9.6

59.3

73.2

Garfield(lO)

11.1

17.0

26.2

51.5

43.4

36.5

Hale(15)

98.4

90.5

87.9

1.5

5.0

Hamilton (2 3)

93.3

92.1

84.3

0.8

0.2

Jackson(5)

41.8

12.2

8.1

26.0

54.7

68.2

Jefferson(18)

86.3

82.5

76.9

7.0

4.2

3.9

8.1

4.1

4.2

66.2

74.8

78.7

99.6

98.4

98.0

100.0

94.0

78.1

Longfellow(14)

96.2

88.1

81.3

Madison(6)

59.8

44.1

McKinley (13)

88.0

75.4

Lincoln (3)
Linda Vista(16)
Loma Alta(ll)

*Key to map on Figure

5

1966

1958-59

—

1963-64

1966

—

—

20.4

37.5

0.4

2.0

81.1

87.0

94.4

—

—

0.8

—
0.2

—
—
—

28.9

—

—

—

3.9

45.7
1.0

4.7

3.7

15.1

2.0

4.7

6.3

24.6

26.5

36.8

55.3

70.5

6.3

18.0

9.2

and rank in percentage of black students in 1966
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Figure

6

(continued)

1958-59

Noyes (22)

100.0

Roosevelt (9)

64.9

San Rafael(26)

1963-64

99.7
58.3

1966

—

—

54.3

19.5

28.6

1966

0.3

'

37.0

—
—
—

__

4.9

52.8

81.2

87.4

97.1

94.2

0.1

1.1

3.7

93.7

93.8

0.1

0.1

98.5

98.1

Sierra Madre(27)

93.6

93.8

94.1

Sierra Mesa(28)

95.7

96.4

96.4

Washington(2)

31.3

9.6

99.8
95.6

Willard(29)

1963-64

99.2

99.6

Webs ter (19)

1958-59

0.4

—

RACIAL AND ETHNIC DISTRIBUTION OF ENROLLMENT IN JUNIOR HIGH
SCHOOL AREAS
Eliot(c)

99.3%

84.7 %

74.6%

0.2%

9.7%

Marshall (e)

97.1

92.2

88.3

1.0

1.9

4.9

McKinley (b)

80.3

61.8

61.6

8."

7

21.2

19.5

Roosevelt (d)

53.7

75.6

68.2

24.1

14.6

18.2

Washington(a)

40.6

15.0

10.7

45.6

67.1

71.1

Wilson(f

96.7

95.9

93.0

—

0.1

0.2

18.4%

RACIAL AND ETHNIC DISTRIBUTION OF ENROLLMENT IN SENIOR HIGH SCHOOL AREAS

Blair(III) * (First year 64-65)

62.9%

60.8%

Muir(II)

80.7

63.3

54.4

Pasadena(IV)

92.5

91.1

Continuation (I)

71.8

63.7

*Key to map on Figure

5

21.8%

22.1%

13.7

26.4

32.6

86.6

3.0

2.5

7.9

48.1

14.1

23.1

43.1

and rank in percentage of black students in 1966.
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Five years after the Supreme Court declared de
jure segregation

illegal, Black parents in Pasadena saw the irony
of de facto segregation

increasing unchallenged.

A landmark ruling in 1963, the Jackson Case,
challenged the
legality of de facto segregation and set a new
precedent for the
State of California and the nation.

Previously, the State Counsel

and County Counsel had argued that school districts
could not take
steps to remedy racial imbalance directly because that
would involve

"ratio or quota plans based on color."

As the Coleman report later

commented, "attempts to achieve racial balance were violations of
the Constitution and.
in school districting.

•

•

race could not be considered as a factor

Apparently previous racial concentration,

aided by districting, had not been so regarded, yet attempts at

desegregation were. "25
During the summer of 1961, the

Board of Education had

denied a request from Jay Jackson, a thirteen year old Negro, that he

be transferred to Eliot Junior High School because Washington was
segregated "and therefore inferior."
the cooperation of Sam Sheats

,

In September, the parents with

a lawyer who conceived of a brilliant

new approach, filed suit against the Board.

Two years after the

Jackson’s initial request, the California Supreme Court established
a clear guideline for "affirmative integration" where residential

Equality of Educational Opportunity
James S. Coleman, jet al.
25.
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1966), pp. 480,

483.
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patterns effectively segregated neighborhood schools."

"Where such

segregation exists," the Court ruled, "it is not enough
for a school

board to refrain from affirmative discriminatory
conduct."

Indeed,

the right of an equal opportunity for education
and the harmful

consequences of segregation require that school boards take
steps,
insofar as reasonably feasible, to alleviate racial imbalance in
schools regardless of its cause. "26

That decision has been the most important legal defense

against the increase of de facto segregation in schools in California.
For Pasadena, it meant that no new schools could be built that did
not decrease overall segregation.

What happened, in fact, was that

Sheats successfully challenged in court school bonds which did not

conform to the Jackson ruling, and white voters in East Pasadena
success fully voted down school bonds which did not conform and would
t

increase integration.

While the Jackson case was in the courts, the Board had
attempted to balance enrollment at the high school level

— where

the

problem was less severe and the commitment to neighborhood schools
less strong.

On Halloween of 1962, the Board and Superintendent

Walter Jenkins appointed a Citizens-Staff Advisory Committee on
Redistricting.

After five months, that Committee presented a plan

for the high schools.

John Muir High School was 77.4 per cent

California Supreme Court Decision, June 27, 1963, as cited
26.
by Coleman, Equality of Educational Opportunity p.480.
,
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Caucasian and Pasadena High School 92.6 per cent.

That imbalance

would assuredly increase if the Negroes currently enrolled in the
feeder schools stayed in the same part of Pasadena.

At the same time,

La Canada, the community northwest of Pasadena-Altadena and formerly
^ P^^t of the Unified School District, had withdrawn.

That decision,

based largely upon their objections to integration at Muir, hastened
the process of racial separation.

The numbers game has always played a major part in debates

over schools and integration.

Was the relevant figure for racial

imbalance 77.4 versus 92.6 per cent or was the pertinent test the
16.4 Negroes in Muir compared to the 2.2 per cent in PHS?

Should

the redistricting committee count on the construction of a third

high school which was needed but which had fallen substantially
short of the necessary two-thirds vote in a bond election two years
earlier?

Was the key fact the 38.1 per cent predicted enrollment of

ethnic minorities at Muir or the 29.5 per cent Negro enrollment?
Or was the crucial issue that four out of five Negroes in high school

were assigned to a deteriorating school?
On April 2, 1963, the Committee submitted its recommendation
for redistricting which would tend to equalize both size and racial

balance (20.3 per cent in Muir and 6.3 per cent in PHS).

Two weeks

later, at the next meeting, "it became clear that considerable

opposition was developing in neighborhoods scheduled to be switched
from the Pasadena to the Muir attendance zone."

In response to that
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pressure, the Board focused attention upon the
possibility of building
a third high school before having to redistrict.

Parent opposition,

particularly from the Noyes Elementary School in eastern
Altadena,
built a case that distance had counted for less than race. 27
Again and again parents voiced their resentment
at being the
pawns in the Board of Education's attempt to
integrate schools.

Unvoiced was their belief that Muir was, or soon would
be, offering
an inferior education along with its integrated classrooms.

(Unvoiced,

because to admit such a belief would raise the question of why
the
city provided an inferior education for areas with a large minority

population.
In the end. Plan B, as the Committee's work came to be

labelled, won little enthusiasm from anyone.

According to the

Coleman report summary of the episode:
The lawyer who had brought the Jackson case, commented that
he thought Plan B entirely too conservative but, after listening
to those who spoke against it, he thought it was "half a loaf."
A member of the committee suggested that Plan B did not constitute
integration, but unless Plan B were adopted as a first step, there
would be de facto segregation in Pasadena.
The Board defended its actions against a proposal from the floor called

Plan C which would have resulted in an ethnic distribution by 1965
of 907 Negroes in Muir and 28 in PHS.

At the Meeting on April 23,

Jenkins reiterated the Board's policy to maintain ethnic balance.
That intent seemed on the liberal side of the debate despite the mani-

27.

Coleman, Equality of Educational Opportunity

,

p.481.
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fest failure of the system to have racial balance

— especially

at the

elementary level where the critical gap between
whites and blacks
in test scores developed. 28

After a month of debate, the Board
recognized that their
simple hope for more racial balance would
not be met without a

bruising fight in the community.

For many persons, that fight seemed

far worse than persistent segregation which
was quiet and peaceful.

Thus, one board member indicated her recognition
of de facto segre-

gation resulting from housing discrimination, but she
preferred to
ignore the result.

Her reasoning showed a remarkable capacity for

ethics to justify segregation:
...a quota plan or number limitation on any race is wrong,
discriminatory, degrading. What earthly right have we to say
to a child, "Because there are too many of your certain race
you must go elsewhere." No more may we restrict how many
persons of any race may live in this community. A quota
restricts the personal liberty rights, if you choose of
some students to go to school nearest that place his family
has chosen to live. 29

—

—

At that juncture, Walter Jenkins proposed an open enrollment

plan which seemed to bypass most immediate objections to earlier
proposals.

Originally, Jenkins proposed that all students except

Negroes should be distributed among three high schools on a geographic
basis, leaving an unfilled capacity of 18 per cent at Muir, 13 per cent
at PHS, and 17 per cent at the proposed Blair High School.

Blacks

28.

Coleman, Equality of Educational Opportunity , p. 482.

29.

Coleman, Equality of Educational Opportunity

,

P.

482.
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could select any one of the high
schools and would have
their first
choice until a school reached
full capacity. Thus
whites would have
neighborhood schools and Blacks
would have integrated
schools-as
long as they bore the costs of
time and transportation
necessary
to achieve that end.
On the advice of the County Counsel
that any plan based on
race was illegal, the Board eventually
adopted an open district

which included most of the Washington,
Cleveland, Lincoln, and Madison
elementary school districts. That subterfuge,
which seemed necessary

before the Jackson decision in June of that
year, allowed the Board
to include a major part of the black population
without mentioning

race, color, or creed.

On June 11, 1963, the Board unanimously adopted the
Superintendent

s

modified plan.

School handily passed.

That fall the bond issue for Blair High
On January 7, 1964, Superintendent Walter

Jenkins presented a detailed plan for carrying out the open
district
plan.

He had to project enrollments for whites and others living

in the PHS and Blair geographic districts so that a sufficient number

of spaces would remain open to achieve a closer racial balance.

Apparently his estimates were thrown off by the movement of parents

with high school age children into the PHS district.

When assignments

were made on March 25, 1964 only 48 open spaces remained at PHS and
the spaces at Muir had jumped to 191.

Under strong attack from

spokesmen for the NAACP, Jenkins worked out an accommodation whereby

nearly one hundred Negro students living in the open district switched
their first choice from Muir to PHS.
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Jenkins and the Board of Education
had gained a considerable
education in matters of racism in
American cities in the nearly
three
years since the Ja ckson suit had
started.
Ihey knew racial balance
would not be maintained by pretending
no problem existed. As one
Board
member wrote:
that at least a Verity of
lawyers would now
u
afte the
jackson case, that a school board could
m
^
^
most certainly
employ
ethnic considerations in drawing
district
lines, and it is not necessary for a
school board to engage in
a verbal minuet mincing back and forth and
sideways, talking of
capacity of school facilities, geographical
considerations, etc.,
while slowly and surely progressing toward its
real goal:
compliance with the declared policy which requires
alleviation of
racial imbalance. 30

H

® atisfi d »

But most white Pasadenans preferred a "verbal minuet"
while abandoning

public education.

4.

Whites Reject Integration

Although the program was cumbersome and not fully effective,
Jenkin

s

open district plan was cited in the Coleman report as a

model which might work elsewhere.

The first year fell short of its

goals; Muir had 29.6 per cent Negroes (rather than 23 per cent) and
PHS had 5.5 per cent (rather than 10 per cent).

"There is still

confidence, however," the Coleman summary added, "that the original
3 — year goals can

be met."

Certainly as of early 1964 no one had any

solutions for racial imbalance in the elementary schools, but the

30.

Coleman, Equality of Educational Opportunity ,

p.

485.

M
- acks011 case established a hopeful precedent.

And for many liberals

both black and white the most hopeful sigh
was the official recognition
that a problem existed and that the Board
would work toward racial

balance.
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Before three years had elapsed, the
shift of white families
away from the Muir district, together with
a rapid increase of black

population, again left the high schools racially
imbalanced.

In

1966-1967, the Jenkins plan had called for Muir
to contain 18.5 per
cent Negroes, PHS to contain 12.9 per cent, and
Blair to contain 17.6

per cent for an average of 15.8 per cent. 'Instead,
Blacks made up

18.8 per cent of the high school population, with Muir having
32.6
per cent, PHS 7.9 per cent, and Blair 22.1 per cent.

Since Negroes

made up 20.6 per cent of the Junior High School population and 27.5
P^r cent of the elementary level, the Board of Education could foresee
a persistent problem with imbalance.

—which viewed
office — saw few

Yet the Board

who voted them into

itself as answerable to the whites
options.

In 1964, Pasadenans had

overwhelmingly supported Proposition 14, an amendment to the state

constitution which effectively sanctioned discrimination by realtors,
landlords, and home owners.

They had elected a former member of the

John Birch Society to the State Senate.

31.

They had rejected the effort

Coleman, Equality of Educational Opportunity

,

p.

484.

Coleman, Equality of Educational Opportunity p. 483. Data
also taken from ’’Pasadena City Schools Racial and Ethnic Distribution
of Enrollment."
32.

,
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of Emmett G. Mickle to reinstate
ward voting for City
Board of

Directors— even though he demonstrated
that he could win a
contest

in

the Northwest community against
the white incumbent (who
handily won

under the at large system because of
east Pasadena's votes).

There were

in short, no signs that the other
agencies and organizations which

made up civic Pasadena were prepared
to see, much less accept, those
nearly one In five Pasadenans with black
33
skins.

Probably the most significant test of
the attitude and anti-

Negro bias of white Pasadenans was reflected
in their abandonment of
public education— despite the success of
districting in maintaining

half of that system more than 90 per cent Caucasian.

Between 1958 and

October 1966, Caucasian enrollment dropped by
1,263.

(About 900 had

left when La Canada withdrew from the main district.)

another 1,600 had left.

Two years later,

By then some 30 per cent of the district's

school age children were in parochial or private schools.

Between 1958

and October 1966, Negro enrollment increased from 3,142 to
7,676, or

an increase of 4,535 students.

By 1969 Blacks and other minority

groups would constitute 39.9 per cent of the total enrollment in the

public school system.

Simple predictions showed minority groups

would have a majority in the district within three years.

33.
Emmett G. Mickle, a member of the Charter Reform Committee and
President of the Westside Study Center Board, ran for the City Board of
Directors in 1967 with a campaign to restore the ward voting system.
Although he was defeated, an analysis of voting precincts published in
the Independent Star-News March 19, 1967, showed the race was even
in the precincts represented by District 1.
,
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The Citizens Task Force Study Committee on High School

Districting revealed in its Preliminary Report to the Board of
Education the same unwillingness to face growing racial imbalance.
In its first stab at identifying the problem, the Committee said

"Pasadena faces a future comparable to those of many eastern cities."
The Committee suggested that the leadership of all minority groups

be involved along with "our governmental agencies, the Chambers of
Commerce, the Planning Commissions, the Boards of Realtors."

inference, the problem lay in population changes.

By

Thus, "Failure to

stabilize the communities within the district will in the long run
result in a future comparable to that of Washington D.C., Baltimore,

and Comp ton."
Finally, the Committee made a specific reference to the problem
in relation to the new enrollment figures.

"This decrease in

Caucasian student population along with the significant increase in the

Negro student population goes to the heart of the overall problem
confronting the entire community."
Blacks?

Was the problem simply too many

The Committee quickly tossed in a liberal bromide.

"The

Committee has concluded that equality of curriculum offerings and
comparable levels of achievement are desirable.

It would appear that

any relatively high Negro enrollment within any high school would

present a critical situation for the entire school."

Should the reader

"Preliminary Report to the Board of Education from the
34.
Citizens Task Force Study Committee on High School Districting,"
Same citation for the following two paragraphs.
February 7, 1967, p.l.
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conclude that the problem with Negroes
was that they were not
equal?
Almost bluntly, the Committee
presented the solution that
equality of education required that
Negroes be somehow equally
dispersed.

The Committee recommended that the
city act "to reduce...

the density of the population in north-west
Pasadena and Altadena and
to enforce all housing codes designed to
prevent overcrowded conditions
in existing dwellings."

Also, the Committee urged "that real
estate

brokers help stabilize the community by discouraging
panic selling
by Caucasians on the west-side, by encouraging more
Caucasians to

move into integrated areas, and by assisting minority
persons to
find homes in surrounding communities, thus taking some
of the pressure

off the Pasadena Unified School District."

attempted to reclaim its liberal reputation:

Finally, the Committee

"All church, social,

and civic groups must be urged to strengthen human relations and to

establish responsible dialogue relative to the community problems
in order that the citizens will take the opportunity to understand

the situation and fully participate in developing ultimate solutions."

The Pasadena Council of Parents and Teachers "Report on

High School Districting" approached a key issue directly.

"If a high

school loses too many of its college-oriented students, it no longer
has enough qualified students to justify teaching certain advanced
courses, so that the quality of the school starts to decline and it

no longer can offer a truly comprehensive program." High school
students had electives which made the difference between preparation
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for college or preparation for nothing.

Although the Council

probably recognized that much of the blame for the
lower achievement
levels of Blacks should be placed on the elementary and
junior high
schools, they nevertheless claimed:

"Our district has 28 elementary

schools, serving 28 neighborhood areas.

The identical classes are

presented in each school, so a child receives the same basic program
regardless of which elementary school he attends." 35
As a result of the new flurry of studies in the spring of

1967, the Board proposed to return the Burbank and Noyes elementary

schools to Muir's district.

According to the new Plan A, by 1970

the percentage racial balances would be as follows:

Blair

Caucasian
62.5

Negro
19.0

Other
18.5

Muir

65.9

23.9

10.2

PHS

75.0

18.2

6.8

The plan would require some additional bussing but it seemed the

only way to maintain comprehensive programs at each high school over
the next few years.
(Instead, in the elections of 1967 two incumbents lost and
the new members succeeded in reversing Plan A.

minority of Caucasians.

Muir did enroll a

Whites left the district in greater numbers.

Early in 1970 Pasadena stood under a court order to integrate all its

"Report on High School Districting," Pasadena Council of
Parents and Teachers, May 8, 1967, p. 1.
35.
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schools by that fall.

Thus, Instead of achieving
racial balance at

the high school level, Pasadena became
the first school district

west of the Mississippi to be threatened
with a loss of funds under the
Civil Rights Act of 1964.)
The long struggle among white and powerful
Pasadenans to do

something about their own discrimination against
Blacks seemed light
years removed from life in Northwest Pasadena.

At a time when

officials spoke as if Pasadena still had a model educational
system,

most Blacks who finished its high schools could not read past
the fifth
grade level.

whites

,

While noting certain differences between Blacks and

Pasadena liberals still boasted that all its elementary

schools had the same program.

That meant the system was suited for

white, middle-class children who learned to read as much at home as
in school and from materials which related to their experiences.

Certainly the "same" program did not produce the same achievement
levels in Cleveland and Washington schools as in Don Benito and Noyes.
Thus the schools simply presented an exaggerated form of a

common Pasadena attitude.

The schools claimed to be a success while

failing to educate children from the ghetto.

Similarly, the city

proclaimed its reputation as a good place to live while persistently

making life unpleasant for Blacks.

Again, in the schools as for

housing, white Pasadenans in control sought to discourage the fast

growing minority.

Instead of working to make Muir a comprehensive

school where black children could learn, they sought to place the

burden of even distribution in schools upon black families.

Rather

than admitting to their failure in schools, the Board and most teachers
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regarded Blacks as an unfair burden somehow preventing them
from
teaching.

5.

Pasadena and VJestside Study Center
"Time Is Running Out"

While Pasadena in the 1960’s had its share of those legitimate
urban problems which hit many eastern cities earlier

buildings and a fast growing poor population
tinct advantages

civic action.

.

— it

— obsolescent

also had some dis-

The city had resources and it had a tradition of

The downtown merchants who exercised unofficial control

had well-established working relationships which made possible many
informal acts of civic betterment.

Caltech, though complacent in

Pasadena affairs as long as it received its requests for zoning
variances allowing new buildings

,

represented a potential for knowledge

and for mobilizing liberal sentiment.

In short, at no point in the

1960's did Pasadena’s difficulties appear unsolvable, even from the

point of view of white residents who had no interest in uplifting the

Northwest area but a simple desire to keep Pasadena a good place to
live

—-as

they defined it.
By the end of the 1960's, under threat of a legal suit for

desegregation, after innumerable investigations and reports, and in
the
light of an undeniable population shift, white Pasadenans faced

facts that had long been known realities in the Black community.

As

admitted in April,
Harry Sheldon, President of the Chamber of Commerce
and as people move we
1969, "We are experiencing the white flight,
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are pulling into the community people of
lower economic capabilities."
Such statements of urgency were met with
a new tone of determination
in other city leaders.

William Pankey, real estate official,
in the

same Los Ang eles Times article declared,
"Anyone who says Pasadena is
going down the tubes is just nuts.

There's too much at stake.

We are

just not going to lose it." 36

The hope for change, made possible by
Pasadena’s unique
resources, and the urgency for change,
evident in increasing forecasts
of decay, were symbolized in Westside Study
Center's hour glass emblem

and motto, "Time is running out."

Certainly, time was running out for

a school board unable to pass a single
bond issue, for white liberals

faced with the exodus of their neighbors

,

for Black children floundering

in deteriorating schools, and, especially, for young men like
Duke

whose adult careers stood at a frightening crossroad.
The story of Duke made clear that the need for Westside had
its
roots years before in the young lives of Black Pasadenans.

Duke’s

experiences in Pasadena schools programmed his life for conflict and
defeat.

Duke spoke of his school years with mixed feelings.

An out-

standing athlete in junior high school, he won acclaim and a form of
success.

In ninth grade he won the All-American Trophy for being the

most outstanding participant in his junior high school.

In high

school, he excelled in track, football, baseball and basketball until

36.

Townsend, "Pasadena’s Crown City Image Tarnished."

72

the point in the spring of his junior year when he
was permanently

expelled.

Clearly quick and bright, Duke experienced far
different

rewards in academics than in athletics. 37

Duke began school at Cleveland Elementary School.

At that

time the school was known as one of the better schools in the area,
a reputation that still continues, although it is slowly being eroded.
It drew

a large part of its student body from the "golden

ghetto"—

an area in the Northwest, quite large in size, which was made of upper

middle class Negro families:
professionals.

doctors, lawyers, engineers, and other

At the end of second grade, Duke was transferred to

Washington Elementary School, reputed to be the worst elementary school
in town.

Duke reported that his "fighting and cussing" were the

reasons for the transfer, and he said his mother just accepted the

word of the school system and did not go in

to'

protest the transfer.

Duke learned to read at Cleveland, but at Washington, he "kind of

stopped learning."

He said it was harder to get to Washington, since

he lived two blocks from Cleveland, but had to take the bus to
Washington.

He remembers Washington as a much rougher school.

When he entered junior high school, Duke was put in
in which he stayed until he left school in eleventh grade.

a special class

The classes

s" and
were large, with 30 to 40 students, but Duke got good grades— "A'

"B’s" mostly.

Dr. Welch, a Pasadena School administrator, described

Pat Sutton, "Duke:
case study)
37.

A Study of Deviance," (an unpublished
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the special class as a class for
educable mentally retarded
youngsters.
He said that, " a youngster like Duke
was known to be dull normal,

according to the school records, but was
not mentally retarded."

He

added, somewhat despairingly, that the
schools put youngsters like

Duke in classes with the mentally retarded
because they did not know

what else to do with them.
Duke's high school career continued to be
tumultuous:

he was

suspended seven times on charges ranging from fighting
to keeping a
loaded gun in his locker.

He was finally expelled for hitting a boy

so hard around the neck that the boy was temporarily
paralyzed.
Dr. Welch had admitted with embarassment the past
practice

of transferring an undesirable student from a good school to a
bad
one.

He also had found it hard to justify placing a mentally capable

student in retarded classes and giving him "A's" and "B's". Yet Dr. Welch

had also admitted without apology that youngsters like Duke were,
in later years, placed in classes called "educationally mentally

handicapped."

For Duke, time ran out before Westside could overcome

the damage done by the schools.

Westside' s success, then, was a product of converging forces
in Pasadena.

It only existed because Pasadena had failed in the past

to house and hire and educate black citizens.

It only existed

because time was running out for Blacks and whites alike.

If, by the

end of the 1960's, the "glass plate barrier" was lowered some, it
was partly due to Westside' s success in communicating the presence
of oppression and partly because Westside suggested the hope of a

creative solution.

C H A P T E R III

MAXIMUM FEASIBLE PARTICIPATION

- WESTSIDE' S

WAR ON POVERTY

The viable alternative that Westside presented
rested on its

strategy of self help.

From its start, Westside Study Center relied

primarily upon time volunteered by the staff and others from
the

Northwest community.

As Westside grew, many white Pasadenans came

to tutor or to assist in other special projects.

Small local

donations kept things going; in one case, a man volunteered to pay
Westside* s phone bill for a month in return for being tutored.

After surviving for two years. Center contributions became
tax deductible and sometimes totaled as high as $1,000 per month from

various individuals.

Without a largely underpaid or volunteer staff,

that sum was insufficient to organize and maintain a limited tutoring

program as originally planned by Gentry, Larsuel, and Williams.

The

real dream of Westside staff and supporters was not just to tutor
Until the tutoring program had some

children and find people jobs.

impact on Pasadena schools, it only did the school's job better and
cheaper.
If Westside were to effect a noticeable change in Pasadena, if
it were to answer more than a small portion of the requests for help,
it had to grow.

Center staff knew persons who wanted help with learning,

or with finding jobs, or with straightening out their lives, or with

finding a new sense of direction.
not time enough,

or staff enough.
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However, too

often there was

A volunteer tutorial program

I
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in Northwest Pasadena could not compensate for the
things untaught

by the schools.

One individual helped was a gain.

But it posed no

threat to the city or to the traditional miseducation of black

youngsters
Westside, then, had to grow in three directions:

First, it

had to expand to meet the needs of black Pasadenans in the Northwest.
The more Westside succeeded, the more it saw to be done, the more

people looked to it for vital human services.
to meet the needs of an expanding staff.

Second, it had to expand

As staff members grew to their

potential, in the New Careers model, Westside looked to wider spheres
of influence.

Finally, Westside realized that separate individuals,

operating with similar goals out of a variety of methods, could change
the lives of people in the Northwest and could communicate that impact
to the white community.

Prior to 1964, self help organizations in ghettoes had few
illusions about obtaining funds.

Both liberals and conservatives

who donated to charity preferred safe organizations which would distribute their benefactions.

important facilities

Boy's Clubs and local Y's often provided

— especially

for boys and girls.

Yet one could

scarcely imagine the YWCA or the American Friends Service Committee
as the focal organization in a struggle to change Pasadena and to

improve its school system.

Rich and eccentric benefactors gave their

money to art museums, Knott's Berry Farm, or a chamber music series
at Caltech.
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To meet the needs it served and to mobilize
a wider range of
resources, Westside had to grow and reach out
into the larger community
It had to seek support in the city at

large— from civic organizations,

from federal agencies, from private businesses— to
broaden its impact
and to supply the many practical needs for staff support,
building
costs, transportation, equipment, and communications.

That process

of seeking support, in itself, also provided a vital learning

experience for Westside's staff.
No experience gave Westside a better insight into fund raising

and politics than President Johnson’s War on Poverty.

A liberal

administration, in part expiating for the assassination of John

F.

Kennedy, passed in 1964 the most liberal economic measure since
the New Deal.

The Office of Economic Opportunity, staffed with ex

Peace Corpsmen and other dedicated young liberals, enlisted in the

campaign to share affluence with America’s poor.

They knew that

despite the inclusion of all the poor and Appalachia, the real test

would be changing the lives of urban Blacks.

1.

Washington’s War on Poverty

In March, 1964, President Johnson announced:

for a national War on Poverty.

Our objective

— total

"I have called

victory.”

His

message to Congress at least allowed community action organizations,
such as the Westside Study Center, to hope for federal support.

President promised to poor people that the government would make

The
an
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effort to allow them to develop and use
their capacities, as we

have been allowed to develop and use ours,
so that they can share,
as others share. In the promise of this
nation."

That mixture of

paternalism and promised assistance was largely
built into any

program which helped someone to self help.l
The Economic Opportunity Act of 1964
included a provision

giving

every American community the opportunity
to develop a

comprehensive plan to fight its own poverty— and
help them to carry
out their plans."

Specifically, the government pledged to
finance

up to 90 per cent of "local plans striking at the many
unfilled needs

which underlie poverty in each community."

As with welfare and

urban renewal, the federal government would make money
available
to cities for them to deal with their problems; but unlike
earlier

programs, the War on Poverty called for localities to involve the
poor.

Indeed, Washington called for their "maximum feasible

participation. "2
The key to both the successes and failures of the War on

Poverty lay in the ambiguous phrase "community action."

From the

start, the Johnson administration was of several minds about the idea.

Together with other former New Dealers, the President drew upon his

Lyndon B. Johnson, "Presidential Message on Poverty (address
1.
to Congress, March 16, 1964)," quoted in Herman P. Miller (ed.), Poverty

American Style (Belmont, Calif.:
1966), p. 212
2.

Herman

P.

Wadsworth Publishing Company, Inc.,

Miller (ed.), Poverty American Style

,

pp.

213,215.
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experiences with the war on unemployment of the
1930's.

The Works

Projects Administration, under which Johnson had
served as the Texas

coordinator for the National Youth Corps, had relied
upon local

initiative and organization for projects which provided
jobs.

Clearly

the political appeal of New Deal programs and rhetoric
for economic

uplift had considerable appeal to the President— and many of his
advisers
The apparent success of non-violent direct action in the

civil rightsmovement in the South encouraged a belief that a similar

method might work in Northern urbanareas.

As Martin Luther King, Jr.

had reminded readers of the New York Times in 1962 "probably the

most powerful force

...

in breaking down the barriers of segregation

is the new determination of the Negro himself.

feel that he

ijs

somebody.

...

And with this new sense of

He has come to
'

somebodiness

and self respect, a new Negro has emerged with a new determination
to achieve freedom and human dignity whatever the cost may be."^

Some liberals hoped to enlist that determination in the war against

poverty's key problem

— hard

core unemployed adults in the nation's

black ghettoes.
Within the government, the President's Committee on Juvenile
Delinquency and Youth Crime under Robert Kennedy had funded pilot
projects to demonstrate the possibilities for community action

Given in Anthony Lewis, Portrait of a Decade (New York:
Books, 1965), p.82. (Italics in text.)

Bantam
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programs.

According to Daniel Patrick Moynihan, "the idea of

community action was in one sense the purest product of academia
and the Ford Foundation.

Its underlying propositions concerning

opportunity structure and anomie constituted a systematic theory
as to the origins and cures, if not of poverty, at least of

juvenile delinquency."

Given support by the Council of Economic

Advisers and the Bureau of the Budget, the notion of community

action promised some way to unite at the local level an increasing
array of federal programs designed to deal with poverty and dis-

crimination in urban areas.
As initially put forward by social scientists, community action

had meant more "maximum feasible participation" than
and local agencies.

a concert of city

Presumably, poor persons needed an opportunity

to break out of their cycle of self-reinforced behavior which some

labeled

a "culture of poverty."

According to Cloward and Ohlin,

delinquency resulted from a lack of opportunity for socially
accepted activities.

Thus Kenneth Clark’s initial proposal for

Mobilization for Youth had argued that "in order to reduce the
incidence of delinquent patterns, we must provide the social and

psychological resources that make conformity possible.

Daniel P. Moynihan, "The Professors and the Poor," in Daniel
Basic- Books,
P. Moynihan (ed.), On Understanding Poverty (New York:
4.

Inc.

,

1968)

,

p. 11.

Kenneth B. Clark and Jeannette Hopkins, A Relevant War Against
Poverty (New York: Harper and Row, 1969), p.30.
5.
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Thus seen, community action went beyond
offering opportunities
to the poor.

Both the provision of services to the needy—
the notion

behind traditional social welfare programs

— and

the provision of

opportunities assumed a degree of helplessness on the part of
poor
persons which was inconsistent with "maximum feasible participation"

by the poor.

It was also inconsistent with the drive for rights and

dignity which the civil rights movement had unloosed as well as with the

anger and bitterness of ghetto residents expressed in Watts and

Pasadena in August 1965.

As Kenneth Clark noted, the participation

of poor persons assumed "that where opportunities are blocked and

services are unavailable to the poor, then the poor, themselves, must
be organized to deal with these and other common personal and community

problems ."6
Finally, community action contained a notion of leadership by
the poor in order to represent their interests in decision-making
groups.

According to Clark's Mobilization for Youth proposal,

"Participation by adults in the decision-making matters that affect
their interests increases their sense of identification with the

community and the larger social order."

The later HARYOU proposal

spoke of "the stimulation of concern among individuals who share a
common predicament, who are the victims of long-standing community
problems and injustices

"7

The successes of the Muslims and other

6.

Clark and Hopkins, A Relevant War Against Poverty

7.

34-35.
Clark and Hopkins, A Relevant War Against Poverty , pp.

,

p.

34.
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militant groups in organizing and
presenting their demands
gave fresh
force among poor and black people for
the possibilities of
countervailing power.
(Clearly, Washington never
thought through the

implications of these aspects of community
action for local government.)
Since no one in Washington, or elsewhere,
knows how to eliminate

poverty (within reasonable budget limitations),
the Office of Economic
Opportunity adopted a tone of modesty,

desire for experimentation,

a

and a preference for testing out community
action in practice rather
than working through its implications in theory.

As Moynihan noted,

Sargent Shriver had "no taste and little patience
for abstractions
such as lay behind the community-action concept."

Also, a Johnsonian

drive for consensus and speed prevented a clarifying debate.

"The

resulting program," Moynihan concluded, "thus represented not a choice
among policies so much as a collection of them."

Furthermore, he noted

that "it is possible to view the War on Poverty as a device that enabled
the federal government to launch a fairly wide range of programs designed

primarily to aid Negro Americans without having to specify their purpose."
And thus racism was another idea mingled into the phrase of community
O

action.
By tossing the complexities of American racism on top of the

complications of American poverty, the War on Poverty opened up pos-

sibilities for community conflicts which could not be covered over

with the modest sums appropriated by Congress.

In most cities, as in

Pasadena, local officials had become exceedingly careless about rights,

8.

Moynihan, On Understanding Poverty

,

pp.

12-13, 14.
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dignity, and public safety of poor
minorities.

Any reasonable community

action which sought the greatest leverage
for change would goad those
existing agencies into serving the needs
of minorities.
And because
Blacks had endured discrimination for so
long, cities could change

only by admitting their previous failures.
As a result of a multiplicity of meanings
and purposes

associated with community action, no part of
the total war on poverty
aroused more hopes, more frustrations, and more
criticisms.

placed part of the failure exactly on its circuitous
history.
he wrote, "the idea of community action

in,

Moynihan
"Thus,"

the context of opportunity

theory was conceived by white social scientists, launched by
white

foundation executives and political activists, brought to Washington

by the same, developed in the (white) President’s Committee on Juvenile

Delinquency and Youth Crime, sold to white economists in the Executive
Office Building, and drafted into legislation by the white White House
task force on poverty." 9

The problem was not just that whites could

not understand poverty and racism but that a major program was launched

using the idea of community action without respect for its power and its

potential for legitimizing black demands.
Thus well-paid professional staffs of local Community Action

Agencies organized meetings and passed on guidelines from the Office of

Economic Opportunity, but they scarcely convinced ghetto residents that
they had a worthwhile role.

9.

In Los Angeles, for example, the Economic

Moynihan, On Understanding Poverty

,

p.

15.
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and Youth Opportunities Agency spent
$60,000 to elect poverty

representatives.

Some 2,659 persons voted out of
an estimated 300,000

families which met the poverty criteria.

Such elections mocked the

naive hopes of many who believed that such a
modest attempt could
arouse the hope and determination of poor residents
to change their
lives
>

•

•

e

Nevertheless, Sargent Shriver and officials in the 0E0
clung
to the rhetoric of community action.

Quoting a demand from a Watts

resident for control because "It is our lives," Shriver responded
that
0E0 had "no intention, of course, of letting any one group, even the

poor themselves, 'run the jobs' or 'run the programs.'"

Still he

insisted, "that token participation is unacceptable."! 0

Nowhere was the gap between the promise of community action as
seen by the poor and as seen by Washington Officials more apparent than
in the Annotated Summary of the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964

most successful community action.

...

:

"The

usually includes the political,

business, labor, and religious leaders, the school board, the employment
service, the public welfare department, private social welfare agencies,
and neighborhood houses in a coordinated attack on poverty."

But those

agencies had already failed the poor and almost universally exhibited
a pervasive white racism.

Thus it sounded strange to add that "above

all it includes the poor people of the community whose first opportunity

See Memorandum from the Director of the Office of Economic
10.
Opportunity, September 9, 1966, Subject: Involvement of the Poor in
all 0E0 Programs.

must be the opportunity to help themselves ,"H
The Westside Study Center staff had already
exercised the

opportunity to help themselves.

Following the disturbance in August

1965, 0E0 allocated substantial funds for Los Angeles.

With the

assistance of Mrs. Eilene Linnblatt from the County Community
Services
the Center submitted a proposal for a comprehensive program for

alienated youths in Northwest Pasadena-Altadena.

In the summer of

1966, the Los Angeles Community Action Agency (EYOA) promised some

funds on a "summer crash" basis for Westside Study Center.
the staff worked long and hard.

anticipated on-going support.

That summer

If their program succeeded, they

Cynicism and frustration had not yet

pervaded the War on Poverty.

2.

The Summer Program, 1966

The 0E0 grant for the summer of 1966 gave Westside an opportunity to demonstrate a comprehensive program for Northwest Pasadena.
The five components Westside designed

— Education,

Career and Job Develop-

ment, Community Services, Sensitivity Training and Cultural Orientation,

and Administrative Services
thereafter.

— remained

the organizing themes of Westside

Planned for a budget of $25,000 per month of $300,000 per

year, that comprehensive program allowed Westside to involve enough

people from Northwest Pasadena so that the city's agencies had to

Sargent Shriver, "An Annotated Summary of the Economic
Opportunity Act of 1964," in Miller, Poverty American Style p.224.
11.

,
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respond. 12
The educational section occupied
a primary place in the

program because it expressed an underlying
conviction that the
purpose was to help hitherto exlcuded
minorities to find a place
and a purpose for their lives in Pasadena
in the 1960's and 1970's.

Children who were made to believe they could
not learn to read or

write were cut off from jobs and future income
before they had any
choices.

Failure of the schools not only limited the
skills which

young black men brought to the job market, but it
weakened their
confidence and their sell concepts so necessary to keep
pushing
for better things.

Discrimination required persistent hope and

effort to overcome.

While the education program emphasized the long run effect
on children who were taught reading from irrelevant materials and
through an inadequate range of services for all age groups, the major
dream, was "to bring about improvement and change in the educational

system of this area through demonstration of effective means and
methods of teaching minority youth."

In the meantime, Westside

offered tutorial assistance for youths already in school.

Further, it

proposed programs "to give vocational skills and strengthen youth's
self concept to supplement job readiness."

Finally, Westside planned

to arrange vocational training with companies who agreed to hire youths.

All quotations in this section are from the "Westside Study
12.
Center Youth Development Project" prepared in the fall of 1966 and
based on the experience of the "summer crash" program.
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By relying upon volunteers and
coordinating with existing

programs

,

the Center hoped to bring about
changes without the

budgetary support required by public schools.

Two coordinators

with assistants would manage the tutoring
and vocational sides of
scheduling, arrangements, and perform other
tasks to help the
coordinators.

Westside anticipated more than one thousand
hours of

volunteered tutoring time each month.

In addition to providing

a variety of services, this component served as an outlet
for

college students, housewives with grown children, and others
who

wanted to do something

yet had no secure sense of what they could

do.

The job development component dealt directly with the critical
level of unemployment among young men and women in the Northwest

Pasadena-Altadena area.

Most firms in the San Gabriel Valley had not

hired Blacks for open-ended jobs.

Pasadena's middle class Blacks

drove to Los Angeles, but poor Blacks found no meaningful jobs in
local stores and industrial firms.

Under the guidance of a group

leader and job counselor at the Center, teams of youth aides visited
firms and asked about possible job openings.

In four weeks, sixty-

eight youths were placed on jobs with advancement potential, a substantial break in the resistance to Blacks by local industries.

At the same time, the youth aides operating in teams gained

invaluable experience and self confidence.

Many personal feelings

of inadequacy and fear of rejection which plagued young Blacks in

personnel interviews were overcome. When youths sought job

openings
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for others as part of a team representing
the Center, youths found

they could talk to company representatives
in positive terms.

Thus

forty part time team members gained
experience with work and with

employment opportunities.

More importantly, their success
built

their self-concept and pride in being able to
help others find a job.

That

esprit

de corps" which pervaded the teams
manifested

itself in the long hours put in by aides who were
paid on a half
time basis.

Enthusiasm and a positive attitude carried forward

in the pre-employment counseling and follow-up services.

New workers

who found employment through Wes tside— often after giving up on the
State Employment Service-had some of that pride rub off on them.

Furthermore, Westside offered counseling and individualized employment

training for persons who wanted help in holding a job or in

gaining

skills for career advancement.
In keeping -with an emphasis upon open-ended jobs with career

potential, Westside applied New Career concepts to its own staff.

Assistant coordinators and team leaders got special training and
upgrading in community contact techniques so they could advance

within the Center or take a career job with industry.

Similarly,

Westside trained aides in community contact methods including approach
conversational methods, and appearance so that they might become
assistants.

Openness and staff flexibility made for inefficiency in a

narrow sense but well served the major purpose of upgrading hard core
unemployed youth.

,
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The community services component
extended Westside's educa-

tional concerns to include the relationship
between individuals in

Northwest Pasadena and the city.

"All that goes on in the
neighborhood

or community affects the youth directly or
indirectly,"

noted.

the proposal

"This means that institutions which impinge
upon youth as

well as youth's behavior must be the concern of
the neighborhood
to see that these institutions are meeting the
needs of youth."

Center staff knew how often a city agency had ignored
the needs of

black citizens

especially those youth with the greatest opportunity

to benefit from community services.
As Westside pointed out, there were few "community supports

to help a youth stabilize if he gets into trouble."

Poverty limited

many parents' capacity to control and help their children.

Cramped

living quarters and an absence of home-centered activities encouraged

boys and girls to linger on streets and parks on their way home
after school.

Such services as the Boy's Club and the YMCA, the YWCA,

and the city recreation program ordinarily required some transportation, some encouragement, and some ability for kids to make use of

available facilities.

Such traditional programs seldom reached out

to involve youths already feeling alienated by parents, schools, and

their city.
For many youths in Northwest Pasadena, alienation and

delinquency began with an early arrest.

Westside developed liaisons

with the local police, probation department, and the schools.

Through

those contacts as well as their familiarity with the neighborhood,
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staff members could learn about an
arrest and discover the
circumstances.
Few youth crimes resulted from
careful
premeditation.

Westside staff consulted with police
and judges.

Then

"As a result of the

Center's work, first offenders have
been counseled and released
on
condition that they become part of the
Center’s program."

Not

everyone thus released thereafter led a
blameless life; but judges,
police, and parents came increasingly to see
Westside as a creative

alternative to repeated delinquency arrests.
As another part of community services, Westside
proposed

additional counseling and group meetings to help bridge
the communications gap between parents and their children.

Often built up

tensions at home contributed to failing work in school
which in turn

encouraged a feeling of anger and a desire to build self confidence
through other actions.

Eventually, such actions led to trouble with

the police and a pattern of anti— social behavior.

how could it be otherwise

— Westside

Often inadequately

functioned as a surrogate family.

It was a place to go; it meant involvement with people trying to make

meaningful changes.

That association could encourage a renewed effort

to improve relationships at home, in schools, and with one’s own image

of himself.
Also, the community services component organized a Weekly

Neighborhood Forum and proposed to publish a weekly newsletter.
There was a need for more communication within Northwest Pasadena
and for relating its needs and fears to the services, ideas, and fears
of the wider region.

By presenting open forums with speakers
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representing such diverse organizations as the
American Nazi party
and Maulana Ron Karenga's US, the Center aroused
a open discussion

ideas and viewpoints of keen interest to Blacks
in America.

The

mimeographed newsletter aimed to publicize "available
services and
opportunities through the Center."

A fourth component provided sensitivity training and
cultural orientation.

In 1965 sensitivity training was a relatively

untested idea, but it seemed particularly useful for getting at some
of the irritants of interpersonal relations between races.

groups, whites and Blacks could bring out their feelings.

In small

They

could discuss previous incidents where hostility or discrimination
or some slight had occured.

Often the shock of discovering that

others had different perceptions and feelings proved sufficient to

open a dialogue.

Westside proposed two focal points:

sensitivity training for

professionals providing services for Northwest Pasadena and cultural

orientation for persons from the community "finding themselves in new
situations of employment or training."

Sensitivity training groups

provided an opportunity for community people to engage in extended
dialogue with agency and school personnel about their "behavior in
relation to members of the community."

Repeatedly white professionals
,

expressed their surprise and shock at learning how their actions
appeared bigoted and definitely uninterested in the problems of the
poor, especially poor Blacks.

By expressing their feelings and

feelings,
insisting that professionals respond with an account of their

on an equal level.
the groups allowed for a kind of interchange
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Although sensitivity and cultural orientation called for
only one full time coordinator, its importance exceeded its
place
in the budget*

Westside staff members had to communicate with all

kinds of people at all kinds of levels.

For example, staff appeared

in court and spoke with judges in their chamber and then also spoke

in the language of youth to establish a relationship with boys on the

street in ways which white judges and professional juvenile officers

could not.
Sensitivity and cultural awareness played a key part in
Westside'

s

ability to communicate , simply because discrimination was so

much a part of the lives of Pasadenans both black and white.

For city

officials and most whites the practice of racism had become so habitual
that it required no more thought than brushing one's teeth in the

Presuming Blacks to be unequal whether genetically or due to

morning.

cultural disadvantages, white Pasadenans saw the deterioration of John

Muir not as a result of Board policies but as
of Blacks.

a result of the presence

Thus Westside had to develop techniques and a position of

influence in order to amplify the impact of Westside' s programs upon
the city.
the
As spelled out in its major proposal, self help remained

Center's philosophy.

But meaningful self help in Pasadena called for

young adults to
"large scale employment of indigenous youths and

provide:"

V
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A.

A broad educational thrust utilizing

B.

A multi-service agency geared and staffed to supplement and

a variety of settings.

reinforce functions either indigenous to the neighborhood
and family or presently not met by the traditional agencies,
such as the police, public schools, probation department,
Department of Employment, etc.
C.

The yardstick agency which tries out and validates new
approaches and which in its competitive coordinating thrust
With the established agencies changes their policies and
practices.

D.

The community-based agency as a rallying point and spokesman
and representative of community interests.

E.

The community-based agency as the core of an interest
alliance extending outside of the local community.

group

A comprehensive program fulfilled "the philosophy of maximum participation in a program of, for,and by the residents of the area involved."

3.

Community Action versus Self Help

Washington’s War on Poverty did play a significant role for
Westside.

At the very least, it provided the rhetoric of a national

priority which heightened the visibility of Westside.

Prior to the

any
War on Poverty, the white power structure of Pasadena had resisted

federal programs

— from

urban renewal to welfare

that the city had any problems.

that would admit

The peculiar combination of shock,

and greed, when War on
after the Watts and Pasadena civil disorders,

pass up, motivated civic
Poverty payoffs became too attractive to
of community action for the
leaders in Pasadena to take up the banner

poor.

Poverty did more good
Probably, in the short run, the War on
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than harm.

From the inside, the national commitment
to a War on

Poverty provided for a time some of the hope
in Westside'
factor."

s

"hope

Despite justifiable skepticism, the early
claims of the

War on Poverty gave Westside staff the hope that
their efforts were

building toward wider circles of support and impact.

Additionally,

the funding of the Summer 1966 program provided
Westside with an

occasion to lay out in detail a comprehensive program and to
structure
an organization for its implementation.

But in the long run Washington's War on Poverty substituted

rhetoric for program.

In spite of the talk about community action

and the possibilities for meaningful change from federal intervention
in local power stalemates, it soon resembled riot prevention rather

than community action.

Most community action groups found money

available only- during the summer months and mainly for activities
involving youths.

A program which kept teenagers occupied picking up

trash along a railroad right of way obtained funding over programs

designed to provide experiences which prepared youths for meaningful
jobs.

Federal funds flowed into programs which promised to keep

troublesome elements occupied.

Local agencies which received funds

became responsible for keeping their city peaceful.

Community action

had somehow become community inaction.

From the point of view of War on Poverty administrators, the
shift in emphasis was understandable.
the public

House

— or

As Moynihan lamented, "Some of

at least Congress, and painful to state, the White

— associate

[civil disorders] with the poverty program, which

began its community action work at just about the time the communities
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became violent."

Congress and the President, in effect, said to

0E0, "You caused all these riots; now you stop them."^
In preparing the Summer 1966 proposal for Washington,
Westside

was well aware of the riot-prevention role they would be
put into.

proposal pointed out the poverty concentration of non-whites
high percentage of youths in the area around the Center.
of the city has also,

The

and the

"The area

it added, "been prone to racial tensions and

flare-ups

Directors of poverty agencies chose some compromise role.

More than most officials, they knew that trash fires and vandalism
in schools and mass confrontations with policemen on busy streets

created pressure for change.

The unpublicized figures showing low

reading scores in black schools, by contrast, tended to justify the
status quo.

Yet violence and vandalism, however effective as protests,

had no connected end product.

Those bright and alienated youths who

found themselves labeled as chronic discipline problems could not

convince educators that schools

—with

their indifference and bigoted

— had

teachers and inappropriate curriculum

failed them.

Similarly,

the shouts from a crowd toward police officers making an arrest scarcely

convinced the police chief that his men needed training in sensitivity.
Accordingly, poverty agencies, including Westside, had an

13.

Moynihan, On Understanding Poverty

,

p.

16.

See the Westside Study Center Master Proposal in the official
files of the director.
14.
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extremely difficult role unless OEO
supported them with awareness
and
care.
Yet OEO seemed more at home with the
pretentious condescension
of the civil rights movement than the
threats of urban violence which

followed Watts.

In order to qualify for funds,
Westslde had to

stress the powerlessness and potential for
violence in Northwest

Pasadena while proposing middle class ways for
ameliorating those
conditions.

Phrased more directly, Westside staff knew
that the

fires in Watts had hastened federal funds for Los Angeles
and the

accompanying disorders along Fair Oaks Avenue during that
August 1965

had made Pasadena a candidate for funds.

At the same time, they

had to hold out a promise of preventing rioting in the future.
For Westside, its disillusion with the War on Poverty in the

Summer 1966 funding was more than merely philosophical.

The "summer

crash" program for Westside promised funds by mid- June; or at least
the Director was to have hired a staff of approximately one hundred,

including about sixty part time aides

,

by then.

money did not come through until the end of July.

Yet the first federal
Somehow administrators

of community organizations were supposed to explain to hard core youths

why pay checks were not available

— and

make them believe Washington

knew about ghetto problems and cared enough to change them.
As the Director commented in October, 1967, before the Ad

Hoc Sub-Committee on Los Angeles Economic Act Program of the United
States Congress, Washington's community action deserved "a mixed

judgment."

President Johnson’s proposal had aroused hope.

motivated people to try.

It had

Yet the money had gone into traditional and
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"safe" programs and agencies, while virtually
ignoring all real

community action.

"To date,"

the Director noted, "the level of

promises and excuses has far exceeded its fulfillment.

The money has

never approached needed levels, with a result that politically safe
or trivial uses of funds have predominated over more effective and

innovative programs."

15

The failure of the War on Poverty above all
demonstrated the

credibility gap between the power structure and the
powerless.

bureaucrats did not know how to recognize community leaders
they honestly looked for them.

even when

They could not distinguish between

community-backed organizations and paper organizations.

who did possess the political

,

City

Those few

acumen and racial understanding to

recognize potential power in the poor communities often used that

knowledge to 'defend themselves against change.

Organizations that

had the potential for significant action were the least likely
be funded.

to

>

Indicative of these weaknesses, by ignorance or design, was
the fact that huge sums of money went to the administrative costs

of various programs, with a small per centage reaching poor people.

Westside ran into this reality first hand in the funding of their
Summer 1966 program.

Part of the late funds came through in July.

In October, Westside met with the 0E0 funding agency, EYOA, to discuss

From the testimony of Atron A. Gentry before the United States
Congressional Ad Hoc Sub-Committee on Los Angeles Economic Act Program,
October, 1964.
15.
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receiving the rest of the funds.

EYOA explained to Westside that

since the funds had not been spent by September 30, they were
no
longer available.

Typical of other funding agencies, EYOA had come

upon some useful "discretionary funds" at the expense of the organization originally funded.
That day in October held symbolic importance for Westside.
Its Director had filed that morning for another year’s leave of absence

from the Army Corps of Engineers.

was back where it started

— standing

By the end of that day, Westside
on its own feet and broke.

In

repeated attempts thereafter to obtain federal support from the

poverty program, Westside met with similar disillusion.

Its job

development component was funded for two successive summers and for
one follow up program, but as a full time community action organization,

Westside got no support from Washington.
Westside was then primed to operate as an organization by the
same philosophy it proposed for individuals.

Westside self sufficiency.

Self help now meant for

The War on Poverty had taught Westside

professional sophistication about federal funding.

It realized, just

support
as it taught tutees and job seekers, that the only reliable
yourself.
is that which you cultivate, consolidate, and maintain

4.

Westside and the Pasadena Business Community

artificial
Community action defined from Washington became an

creation.

ostensibly
City officials, representatives from a host of

poverty representatives
public service organizations and a handful of
,
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came together not because they wanted to
fight poverty

over control of federal funds.

but to fight

In that power struggle
those groups

who got on the inside track had all the
advantages-witnessed by the
continuing relationship between the Los Angeles
School Board and
EYOA.

Poor people and new organizations, such as
Westside had been in

1966, simply had nothing to trade with established community
groups.

After a time 0E0 officials became very frank that no
local
group could get funds unless it had "clout," which meant
political
support, usually in Congress.

Cut off by Johnson soon after its

inception, 0E0 operated from top to bottom on the basis of trading its

money for political support.

Organizations which might actually do

something for poor persons, and thus might demonstrate the carelessness
and bigotry of most agencies, threatened local power structures.

By

requiring a negotiation in political support, 0E0 condemned itself to

dealing with safe programs such as Head Start or politically accepted
groups, rather than with groups like Westside.

At times Westside had a negative clout in Pasadena’s Community

Action Agency because it did too much for too little money and seemed
too little responsive to established powers in Pasadena.
of Westside' s "Late-Start" Proposal

The evaluation

by the Pasadena Commission on

Human Needs and opportunities reflected this "negative clout."
staff reported:

PCHNO

"....this proposed project is far too ambitious in

its nature to be practical.

Most of the tutoring is supposed to be

done by volunteers, yet recruitment of volunteers is not explained.
two educaThere is no provision for training of tutors, etc. also, the

package
tional components are not welded together into one overall
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project to get people working."

It was ironic that PCHNO,
knowing

full well Westside's accomplished deeds in its
tutoring program,

evaluated a proposal for the expansion of that
program in a vacuum. 16
By the end of 1966, Westside saw that it had
power, but not

the kind of power that would wield influence with 0E0.

Even though

some top officials in 0E0 saw Westside as one of the best
programs in
the country, they could only give peripheral support.

The pressure

they were under for safe programs with political pay-offs tied their

hands.

For example, the Western Regional 0E0 officer insisted that

PCHNO revise their muddled evaluation of Westside's program.

But a

fairer evaluation was not enough to assure funding.

For Westside, then, self help meant finding those things
which

people wanted and would pay for rather than pursuing some pie-in-thesky demands.

It meant finding tangible trade-offs with businesses—

preparing people for jobs for which there was a demand and taking the

burden off management for minority group recruitment, training, and
counseling.

White businessmen in Pasadena, by 1966, realized they

needed the resources of black Pasadenans to meet employment demands,
especially for semi-skilled labor employed in industries producing for
the war in Viet Nam.

The civil disorders in 1965 and the new rhetoric of government
programs probably also contributed to the sense that the black community

Memorandum from the Pasadena Commission on Human Needs and
16.
Opportunities
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in Pasadena could no longer be ignored.

But local firms faced a

problem of how to set up lines of communication that never
existed
before.

No Pasadena agency provided that kind of bridge between
Blacks

who wanted jobs and local businessmen until Westside, through its
tutoring program, brought Blacks and whites together in an environment
of some understanding.

Westside offered Pasadena business management a vehicle for
communication.

Westside could recruit, train, and counsel unemployed

Blacks and help ease the strain between disenfranchized Blacks and the

white power structure.

In return, Westside received financial support

and good jobs in which to place trainees.
This kind of trade-off worked well, and Westside by 1969 had

cultivated wide-spread support in the business community and had

placed hundreds of young Blacks in meaningful, open-ended jobs.

When

they did well, they encouraged firms to return to Westside for other

recruitment and for counseling and sensitivity services.

The lesson

Westside learned about successful negotiation and self help was passed
on through the staff and permeated its job training philosophy.

How

could a bitter young Black get and hold a job in the face of racism
and discouragement?

He could do it by seeing the process of trade-offs.

hiring and
Rather than being "the man's boy}' a victim in the game of
terms.
firing, he became his own man, negotiating on his own

component to
The device Westside used in its job training

self-confidence was the
communicate this philosophy of trade-offs and

"mirror technique.

"

A full-length mirror was set up at the Center.
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Trainees were encouraged to look at themselves through
the eyes of

prospective employers, to imagine what they would want
to see and
hear.

How would an Afro haircut affect them?

to a business suit?

mumbled answers?

To dark glasses?

How would they react

To a bashful attitude and

After viewing themselves from the role of an employer,

trainees could plan how to "con” an employer into giving them a job.

Give the employer what he wants to see and hear in return for a job.
The goal, reflecting the goals of Westside in negotiating with white

businesses, was to find a way to trade off.

Building on the mirror technique, Westside staff showed job
trainees how to project a positive approach.

They told a trainee to

use his own vernacular and go and con the man out of a job.

They

#

put it as a kind of dare, a challenge. Westside had to break the
I

cycle of short-term jobs and fear of getting fired.

A young black man often believed he would get fired sooner or
later.

To keep his self-respect and pride, when he knew the supervisor

was going to terminate him, he would try to get fired for being a bad
actor, or not coming to work on time.

A self-created situation was

better than suffering the indignity of doing a good job and being cut
loose for being Black.
dare:
Thus Westside trained people in a positive approach as a

the man out of a
"I bet you can’t run a game on the employer and con

job for a year.”

Then a trainee could take the challenge, put on the

role, and become a part of that company.

Once he bought a car or made

part of the economic system.
a down-payment on a house, he had become a
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Businessmen in Pasadena were excited about the trainees

Westside recommended to them, who were sharp, professional, and
positive.

Most Pasadena businessmen had not believed that young

black people could be that strong and positive.

Businessmen got

interested and started coming around to Westside to see what was
happening.

They trusted Westside and would often hire untrained

people, confident that Westside would help with the basic skills and

would keep tabs on the workers' problems.

Businessmen understood good

business, and they made money by employing people recommended by the
Center.

Companies like Sears and Roebuck, Consolidated Electrodynamics

Corporation, and Electro Optical Systems in Pasadena supported Westside
financially, hired its trainees, and opened new communication with

Northwest residents in response to Westside' s charismatic atmosphere.
As Westside strengthened its support in the business community

through job recruitment, training, and counseling, another kind of

trade-off relationship developed.

Businessmen needed tangible evidence

of their concern for the community; Westside needed publicity and

legitimacy in the larger Pasadena community.

As a result, Westside

programs
staff participated in various workshops, conferences, and

organizasponsored by Kiwanis Clubs, Rotary Clubs, and other business

sponsored by Westside.
tions, and various business groups came to events
time helping out
Businessmen came to the Westside jazz festival, spent
the weekly Community Forums,
in the Center, and frequently showed up at
as speakers or listeners.

Supervisors sponsored
When the Los Angeles County Board of

a

Westside’ s Director served on
county-wide conference on New Careers,
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the planning committee, and Westside staff participated in the conference

along with national figures such as Dr. Arthur Pearl.

Businessmen

turned to Westside more and more for leadership in discussing the

problems of racial conflict and poverty in Pasadena and the Los Angeles
area.

In return Westside gained legitimacy and some fame for its
o

innovative and successful programs.
Support from the business community proved invaluable to

Westside.
foundation.

It gained financial backing on a broad based, reliable

Remarkable breakthroughs were gained in the crucial area

of job training and placement.

Business gained from Westside a

vital link in communication with Pasadena's black community.

Above all,

the black white barrier that immobilized Pasadena on so many other

sensitizing
levels started to break down because of Westside' s skill in
Pasadena.
white businessmen to the talents and needs of young Blacks in
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CHAPTER

IV

A CURRICULUM FOR THE COMMUNITY—
EDUCATIONAL PROGRAMS
The story of Westside Study Center
revealed, through a kind
of reverse imprinting, the failures
of urban education in
America.

Organized in response to a need for a
broad range of self help
programs, the Center showed most clearly
what had not been done.

It

became a crucial learning center for relating
the immediate needs of

black children to the larger contexts of Pasadena
and the national
commitment to meaningful equality for all citizens.
Pasadena, by the 1960's, exhibited those elements
which

characterized urban problems in American cities:

its racially

separated schools provided a focal point for the prejudices and
fears of the majority; white families were pulling out, taking with

them support for public education; poverty, unemployment, sub-standard

housing and inadequate public services condemned its ghetto to

a

cycle of defeat; hostility and fear between Blacks and whites held
the potential for alienation and violence; and, above all, the failure

of its public schools to meet the needs of black children foreshadowed
an intensification of those problems.

Westside' s programs demonstrated to a wide audience the needs
of Blacks in Pasadena.

Each program, each function of Westside evolved

in response to a serious and immediate need.

Most important, those

needs had been articulated by staff and supporters of Westside, not by

endless social and economic surveys.

On the simplest level, Westside
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succeeded because of its ability to communicate those failings
of
urban education to Pasadenans and, at times, to poverty program

bureaucrats
Secondly, Westside'

s

educational programs demonstrated how

change could come to meet those needs.

In a sense, the Center

demonstrated the validity of community schools.

But "community

schools" like "community action" rapidly became a slogan filled with
ambiguity.

Community schools meant anything from advisory boards with

token parent representation to community control of the kind that

rocked Ocean Hill-Brownsville.

The notion of community control became

so politically charged that only extremists survived the fight for it.

Westside, on the other hand, demonstrated that community

control depended upon community caring and community self help.

There-

fore, change in urban education was possible without massive intervention,

without multi-million dollar programs and swarms of highly paid experts.
"The culture of poverty," "education for the disadvantaged," or "The

War on Poverty" made little sense at Westside.

If teachers cared

enough to teach, if school officials cared enough to insist on equal

education

— in

other words, if white racism were neutralized

— children

would learn in city schools.
Kenneth

B.

Clark, in an article in the New York Times underlined

to justify bad
the effects of "culture of poverty" euphemisms used

teaching:
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The concept of the "culturally disadvantaged" is part of the total
thesis that minority group children suffer from economic, cultural
and political disadvantage and, therefore, cannot be expected to
learn as white children do. This argument, like the theory of
racial inferiority of these children, assumes that since educational
disadvantage reflects more basic disadvantage, one cannot expect the
schools to succeed until the fundamental economic or biological
disadvantage has been removed. This thesis I reject categorically
....[Negro youngsters,] when they are adequately taught. .. also learn.

Clark pointed out the "guise of compassion" that categorized whole
groups of children as inferior "and denied each child, so stereotyped,

his individuality and his potential, thus perpetuating the self-

fulfilling prophecy of massive educational under achievement for all
these children."^-

It was Westside’s experience that the brightest

children were most often casualties in the schools’ degrading "guise
of compassion."

Westside's educational program proved those simple facts.

Its

tutoring program, its job training program, and its adult education

program all succeeded because of self help, community concern, and
caring.

The "hope factor" restored to individuals their dignity,
The conclusions for the field of urban

potential and self-esteem.

education were so elementary that it was unlikely they would be
recognized by economic and social experts whose reputation and livelihood
rested on complex solutions for complex problems.

The Tutoring Program

1.

its early
The tutoring program was the heart of Westside during

Effective
Kenneth B. Clark, "Answer for ’Disadvantaged’ Is
1970.
Teaching," New York Times January 12,
1.

,
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stages of development.

Through tutoring and being tutored, people

from the community learned about the Center as a place to seek help.

Tutoring also provided those who wanted to contribute time and skills

with useful and meaningful tasks.

People who joined the program,

caught up in the spirit of Westside, ranged in education from high

school drop-outs to a prominent professor of aeronautical engineering
o

from Caltech.
The founders of Westside knew from their personal experiences
in schools that children, especially boys, reached a confrontation

point around third grade.

At that point, the humiliation and defeat

of not being able to read and write began to have very personal and

racial meaning.

In the school years that followed, de facto illiteracy

meant failure in most other subjects.

By young adulthood, that

humiliation made necessary either aggression, defeat, or an elaborate
pattern of self deception.

Most high school graduates in poverty

areas could not read beyond the fifth grade level.

Students who knew they were bright and capable and wanted to

be doctors, lawyers, electricians also knew the bitter truth that
they could not read.

Malcolm X’s experience was not unusual— he

entered jail unable to read a newspaper.

Compounding that tragedy,

children.
most black parents believed that schools were educating their

in
Information on Westside Study Center educational programs
many
Chapter IV is based on the files of the Director, including
proposals prepared for local and federal funding.
2.
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They wanted their children to read and write because
they had lacked
that opportunity.

Children in that double bind were programmed for

bitterness and aggression.

It was typical that the brightest boys

sst trash fires in the schools, broke windows, and cut classes.
The immediate need Westside served in its tutorial program

was for remedial reading and math, as well as assistance with English
and grammar.

Most importantly, Westside developed an incentive to

learn in an environment that was acceptable, informal and relaxed.

Interviews with public school teachers and administrators indicated
that, while some were aware of these needs, formality of structure,

facility and financial shortage, and a communication barrier prevented
a comprehensive, massive attack on the problem.

Again, the founders of Westside looked for solutions to

problems in reading and basic skills from their own experiences.
They had found that phonics helped them.

Phonics had the advantage

of being largely oral and could utilize familiar words.

Children

could take words apart and relate them through the use of syllables.
The process of repetition could develop new patterns of reading and

spelling and provide the key to learning.
Billy Williams borrowed a few dollars from his boss and
Saturdays
bought some books, and the three founders started meeting on

drug store.
with children Williams had contacted through working at the
of
When the founders obtained more information about the failures

and rented
education for Blacks in Pasadena, they decided to expand

Half the windows
an old building from the Elks for $80 per month.
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were out and there was no heat.

The tutoring program grew

— sometimes

a class of forty to fifty met in a nine by twelve foot room.

Parents became involved.

They formed a car pool, organized a crafts

program, and provided cookies and juice on Saturdays.
Soon Westside added remedial reading courses and tutorial

assistance in math, social studies, and English.
four evenings a week.

activities.

Classes were scheduled

Weekends were devoted to craft and recreational

A "junior executive" class was conducted on Sundays.

The

class was specially directed toward the youngster with leadership

qualities who might otherwise devote time, effort, and ingenuity to

anti-social activities.

To make such a leader useful at Westside

was the first st p in allowing him to be useful in society.
The tutoring program extended to resemble a full-fledged

academic program including reading, mathematics, English, humanities,
creative education and science.

An early tutoring program proposal

iphasized the following content:
1.

Reading
Phonetics
Reading Comprehension
Spelling
Language Development
Foreign Languages

2.

Mathematics
Elementary math fundamentals
new math
Upper Division-algebra,
geometry, calculus,
engineering math

3.

English
Syntax and Grammar
Vocabulary

4.

Humanities
Social Studies
Civics
History

5.

Creative Education
Art
Music
Cultural Appreciation

6.

Science
Individual attention by
graduate students. Conceptual bases of science.
Cross-cultural translation
science- problems.
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The tutorial program began with
in-service sessions with the
tutors and the educational coordinators.
At those meetings, tutors

discussed the goals of the Center and
nature of the problems confronting
the tutees.

Guidelines were set up and materials to
be used in the

program were explained.

Additional in-service training sessions
were

held where Westside paraprofessionals exchanged
ideas with professional
personnel from local colleges and the Pasadena
School System.
Two hundred tutees enrolled in the 1966 summer
session, the

greatest number of which were elementary level students.

The

elementary children were tutored three days a week— Monday,
Wednesday,
and Thursday

in morning and afternoon sessions of approximately

forty to fifty minutes each.

Tuesday and Wednesday evenings were

allotted to tutees at the high school level.

On Tuesdays arts and

crafts teachers from the Girls’ Club of Pasadena came to the Center and

provided a complete program.

During the rest of the week crafts and

recreational facilities were available before and after tutoring.
Fridays were designated for field trips which provided the children with

wider cultural experiences.
Data tables from an EYOA evaluation of Westside in November,
1966 provide a profile of the educational aides employed in the tutorial

program.

About half were under eighteen, almost evenly divided between

male and female.

Mexican-American.

Three were white, fifty-one were Black, and one was

Twenty-five had not finished high school, and eight

had completed their first year of college or more.

About half came

from families with five or more members; forty-six out of fifty-two

reported family incomes below the federal poverty criterion (see figure

7).
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Questionnaires indicated that aides came to Westside by word
of mouth information.

Two- thirds evaluated the program as "Very

valuable," the remainder rating it "Of Some Value."

In response to

the question "Do you think that if things go well for you after

this program is over, it will be because the program has helped you
in some way?"

Sixty-nine per cent answered "Yes."

Over half rated

O

the staff they worked with as "Excellent."

After two and one half years of operation, Westside could
summarize the strengths of its tutoring program:

successful on a one to one basis.

Tutoring was most

The personal contact and empathy

process.
between tutor and tutee were essential factors in the learning

many minority children
At some time between the third and fifth grades

were "turned off

"

about school.

Therefore, the tutor’s main function

the tutee a feeling of
was to overcome a lack of trust and to give
At

she could learn.
self confidence by showing the tutee that he or

the progress that a student
each meeting tutors emphasized step by step

made.

enjoyed tutoring
Senior and junior high school students
training, they became most
elementary school students; wilh proper

effective tutors

.

operation between
Such a program was already in

Elementary Schools.
Washington Junior High and Washington

In cross-age

Krasnick, "Westside Study
Thomas A. Anderson and Harry
r
Final Evaluation Report>
„,
Center Youth Development Program
Angeles, November 1966.
Los
Greater
of
Agency
Youth Opportunities
,

S

c

“

'
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tutoring, older students learned as well as younger.

As the summer

program in 1966 revealed, learning motivation and self confidence of
young people were greatly stimulated by employing them part time as
tutors of younger children.^

Involvement of parents in the tutorial program was an

important factor in the success of such a program.

with tutees on an average of five hours per week.

Tutors could work

When parents were

possible.
involved in the tutoring program, much faster progress was

materials for home
Westside planned special classes for parents, reading
use, and information on counseling procedures.

Parents’ and citizens'

concerned with
organizations in the Washington Elementary School area

program and their
education were informed of all components of the
ideas and assistance were welcomed.

comprehensive training
The Westside Study Center proposed a

program for tutors.
'

people
Starting in February, 1968, twenty young

would be employed as tutor trainees
from the high schools of Pasadena
hours over a three week training
at $1 per hour for a total of 24
initial training, each of these tutors
period. After completing their

seeking help in reading for
would be assigned to a tutee
ten weeks.

a period of

would spend an average of
During this period the tutors

an hour.
tutoring, at a rate of $1.50
five hours a week in

4-

m

a
l
effect, Westside had develop*

=ioi°De«r^

catalog of progrLs
Education.
by the U.S. Office of

This rate

Education
for 1970, published
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would be maintained at that level thereafter.

week period would be followed up by
hours each week)

,

a two

This first thirteen

week tutor workshop (two

designed to iron out "hang-ups" and problems

experienced by tutors.

Then the tutors would be assigned to a second

ten week period.

A consulting staff would consist of ten volunteers, including
professional teachers, student teachers and Caltech professors.

This

phonics
staff had the assignment of adopting the methods, including

lesson plans, and
and sight recognition processes, preparing the

recommending materials for the tutor training program.
some of the experienced tutors

,

Along with

they would conduct tutor training

programs and various workshop sessions.

They also would review

proposals for support by private
the program periodically and prepare

and public agencies.
tutorial program was not to
In summary, the purpose of the
of the public schools in order
supplant but to supplement the work

and minority students could learn.
to establish that poor

It provided

the
one basis in order to overcome
individual tutoring on a one to

advancement of minority students-reading
principal barrier to the
problems.

own reading abilities
Participating tutors improved their

younger children.
self confidence by teaching
own
their
to
added
and
education of
closely involved with the
were
parents
time
same
At the
reading
stimulated to improve their own
their children and were
and interest
education. That involvement
abilities and interest in
teaching and
the schools for better
on
pressure
create
helped

compensatory

support.
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Westside's tutoring program, in fact, reached far beyond

merely supplementing public school education.

The Center provided

a bridge between disenchanted students and school authorities.

The

EYOA evaluation described a typical example.

A specific example from the records of Westside Study Center is
that of Roy D. , a fifteen-year-old Negro aspiring to be a
medical doctor. Because of Roy's middle-class values and
lower-class background, he was adjudged to be aggressive and
hostile by school personnel, who felt Roy should expect and
accept mediocrity in grades and counseling.

Roy D. was sent to a juvenile detention camp because of his
involvement in setting a trash can fire at a local elementary
school.
This has been a serious setback for him in pursuing
his professional career. In subsequent months other school
fires were started in protest to various school policies by
youths with similar frustrations. At this time, Westside
Study Center was able to work with both students and the school
administration to stop turmoil, change school policies, and
reinstate those students expelled during the demonstrations
.

That incident demonstrated Westside's influence with public

school officials.
and teachers.

Westside facilitated communication between parents

Often Westside staff provided the key for reconciliation

between a hurt and angry parent and a defensive teacher or administrator.
Elementary school teachers from nearby Washington Elementary began
coming to Westside after school to tutor children.

It seemed ironic

failures
yet fitting that teachers in a ghetto school, realizing the

counteract that
of their roles within that school, came to Westside to
failure.

5.

Anderson and Krasnick, "Westside Study Center," p.5.
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2.

Job Training

As residents in Northwest Pasadena gained trust
in Westside'

tutoring services, they turned to the Center for job training
and
job development.

A 1967 survey of the area around Westside revealed

that more than “four in ten adults had not completed high school
in ten had not completed more than an eighth grade education.

was an obvious desire for self-improvement:

j

two

There

nearly half of those

surveyed indicated a "strong interest" in participating in adult

vocational educational programs, if they became available.

Among those

already employed, a substantial interest was expressed in opportunities
for job and career advancement if training programs became available.

The Westside Study Center saw the need, the direct connection

between education and jobs on the individual and community level, as

well as in light of national trends toward human services which underlay
the New Careers idea.

Frequently on a tutorial basis and sometimes

in formal classes taught by volunteers, Westside had helped adults

meet educational requirements for finding and advancing in a job.

And

for many students from poor families, the frustration and social pressures

deriving from a lack of spending money aggravated difficulties with
school.

Often a part-time job did as much as tutoring to keep young

young people in school and learning.

See "Neighborhood Social Diagnostic Survey," prepared in
cooperation with the Community Redevelopment Agency of Pasadena,
April 1967.
6.
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At the community level, Pasadena's
vocational and job training

had serious lacks.

Its educational system was structured
for college

preparation (at least for whites).

Caltech, ostensibly a "vocational

institution," preferred boasting of its Nobel
laureates to providing
training programs benefiting the local community.

Rated as one of

the best in the state, Pasadena City College (PCC)
attracted

students who wanted an inexpensive first two years before
going on to

UCLA or elsewhere as well as girls who wished to compete for
queen of
the Tournament of Roses.

^

As a result of its emphasis upon academic standards,
Pasadena

City College often failed to serve its ostensible purpose as a

community service for those who lacked financial resources for a state
college or university.

Consequently, PCC had an extremely small black

enrollment while California State College at Los Angeles, although
farther away, had a large enrollment from Pasadena and by 1969 a majority
of its enrollment was from minority groups.
In Pasadena, neither the time, place, attitudes of teachers, or

subject matter encouraged minority group enrollment in vocational programs.

High school and PCC courses in vocational education suffered from

those characteristic problems which have given such programs a bad

In 1969 a Caltech student project made clear that job training
7.
for minority workers was not inconsistent with high academic standards
for Caltech; but more to the point, its Jet Propulsion Laboratory
located in Northwest Pasadena ignored the problems of local residents.
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reputation throughout the nation.

Training for carpentry or plumbing

was a waste of time as long as tightly-controlled unions kept Blacks
out.

Likewise, shops had machines and procedures twenty years out of
Furthermore, instructors, emulating their academic colleagues,

date.

were more concerned with failing students than with teaching them.
On the other side, employment services by the state or agencies
such as Urban League also adopted the idea of "qualification" as

prerequisite for job placement.

Electronics firms which hired unskilled

assembly line workers at minimal wages had moved to less expensive land
farther east in the San Gabriel Valley. Local firms and Caltech's Jet

Propulsion Laboratory, which hired many fairly skilled laborers in
addition to a scientific staff, showed no interest in hiring poor and

minority workers and upgrading them into the skilled category.
Prior to Westside, no organization or company seemed willing
to take the risks of on the job training or vocational preparation

of unskilled laborers.

In a form of de facto discrimination, firms

and institutions and agencies felt comfortable servicing only the

skilled workers in Pasadena.

The impact of that system of prerequisite

qualification has been well documented.

Unless upgrading and on the

job training were built in for minority workers

,

even those

fully

echelons of
qualified" were reluctant to compete in the hostile high
mail for the
private business. Many black college graduates carried
O

Post Office, where at least they would not be fired.

see William H.
For other examples of self-lowered expectations,
Bantam Books, 1969),
Grier and Price M. Cobbs, Black Rage (New York:
pp. 109-128.
8.
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Because of those needs for meaningful employment, Westside
Study Center expanded from tutoring to job development and job
training.

Its approaches in tutoring and job counseling were similar

whatever one’s age or experience

— relate

on a one to one basis, build

trust and self confidence and the "hope factor."

Soon Westside

incorporated adult basic education, sensitivity training (both for
employers and employees) and vocational training.
The essential step in transforming a hard core, poverty-bound

person into a productive worker was to develop in him a positive
attitude and self image.

That change in his entire outlook required

sensitive and extended guidance on an individual basis

—a

conclusion

which followed from the established failure of standard methods to
reach the hard core unemployed.

He had to see himself as a potentially

capable and useful member of a middle class society. He had to learn to
express that new viewpoint so that he could communicate with teachers,

line foremen, and others.

Only then would he have the motivation and

adaptability for learning skills and habits which could contribute to
employment and advancement in skill levels
The first requisite for such a change, of course, was to hold
and would
a steady job which offered vocational learning experiences

not end in a short time.
openings would

But Westside realized that the best of career

not— by themselves— produce

desirable changes in those

chronic
persons who had adapted their lives to occasional work and

accumulated possessions.
welfare without financial responsibility or pride in

see Elliot Liebow,
For a fine study of the street corner men,
Company, 1967).
Tally’s Corner (Boston: Little, Brown, and
9.

9
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The second requisite was for counseling— direct

,

personal,

extensive and continued assistance over both vocational and domestic
problems

Often the best counselors were those young men and women

.

who recently had found their own way from aimless hanging around on
street comers to meaningful employment.

Those persons possessed a

rare skill because they were bilingual in a language of inflection

and idiom.
feited.

They could convey an empathy which could not be counter-

Sometimes inadequate living conditions or transportation

facilities made promptness and neatness difficult.

A good counselor

assisted a new employee in finding better quarters and transportation.
Similarly, legal problems or credit delinquencies often required a

time-consuming effort by a counselor before a trainee could concentrate
upon his own vocational training.

A third requisite in the Westside design for getting an
unemployed person ready for training and advancement was basic education.
The ability to read at least up to the fifth grade level was imperative
if training were to succeed.

Usually the never-quite-adequate reading

and writing skills of the unemployed all but disappeared in a few

years of idleness following formal education.

Trainees needed instruc

their
tion in reading, arithmetic, and writing that was directed to

situation and did not repeat methods which failed the first time.
was
Memorization of addition and subtraction— never much use anyway—

subtract 5/8
less important than making clear what it meant to

or

in inches.
to multiply by 12 to get every dimension

had to be coordinated
All Westside vocational training programs

existing state and company programs.
with job openings as well as with
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The training and counseling had to fit the job and the person's

individual needs.

Consequently, many programs proceeded on an ad

hoc basis and then were not repeated.

For example, some volunteers

from the State Highway Division offered instruction to pass a California

exam for Engineering Aides because they had some openings at that time.

Westside also worked with training nurses aides, a field which seemed
an expanding source of jobs in Northwest Pasadena.

Due to its successful experience with hard core unemployed,

Westside was invited by local firms to sub-contract for counseling
and basic education as part of Manpower Development and Training Act
contracts.

Two years after Westside had worked out its ideas for

vocational training, the United States Department of Labor set up a
special contract procedure which "goes beyond conventional 'on-the-job
training programs."

The government established a special program

offering "funds to offset the cost of recruiting the disadvantaged,
and
providing remedial education, counseling, on-the-job training,

transportation
supportive services such as minor medical care and

where needed." 10

provide
In Pasadena, only Westside Study Center could

recognized as essential
those services which at last the government had
for a successful program.

Corporation,
Letter to B.W. Cobb, Consolidated Electrodynamics
Administrator, United States
Pasadena from Stanley Ruttenberg, Manpower
Department of Labor, January 9, 1968.
10.
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3.

"Late-Start" Adult Education

,

In November of 1967, Westside prepared a comprehensive

program for adult education called "Late-Start."

Because of its

reputation in Pasadena, its active job development, and its success

with short term pilot programs, Westside would have no difficulties
in recruiting persons for the program.

Increasingly, volunteers had

appeared from the Negro middle class who had a special contribution
to make to the community, but who needed staff time to arrange classes

and counsel both teachers and students.

The effort to match abilities

and willingness to help with tutees’ needs in the optimum way took

substantial time.

The challenge was to integrate the various activities

and continue a balanced program of adult education through an entire
year.

Westside undertook a comprehensive six-part program for Adult
Education, "Late-Start":

improved skills.

The first component focused on training for

Westside had worked with fifteen semi-skilled or
Their

unskilled workers who attended classes for five hours each week.
for a
immediate objective was to pass the California examinations

degree.
general education diploma— the high school equivalency

The

neighborhood people
setting at Westside, close to and familiar to the

optimism about the place
who needed help, provided an atmosphere of
encouraged self
among the members of the ghetto community which

improvement.

already
Persons who volunteered for such a course were

effort was rewarded with
somewhat motivated, and usually their

advancement.
lower skills.

for those with
That shift allowed room at the bottom
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Westside proposed expanding that program to five or more
programs per year, offering eight weeks of instruction to twenty persons
at a time.

In addition to formal classes taught by professional

teachers in adult education courses, the Center would add personal

tutoring and counseling, open discussions about the difficulties
encountered, and lessons in how to take examinations.
In order to push this segment forward Westside proposed a

full time coordinator, two aides, and some outside consultants who

would advise about ways to speed up the time needed to pass the exams.
The coordinator would counsel and test potential members of the class
and volunteer tutors and instructors, and he would continue that general

oversight throughout the course.

Under his direction two part time

aides would learn about teaching while performing routine services
and tutoring.

Finally, in order to allow anyone to take part in the course

who wanted to and also in order to cut down on absenteeism and failure
to complete the course

education

— Westside

— two

problems of particular importance in adult

proposed a scholarship of $75 for anyone who

successfully finished eight weeks of instruction.

In most cases the

babysitting costs or books.
money would be needed for transportation or
prevocational
A second component, related to the first, was

training for the unemployed.

A pilot effort at Westside involved ten

hours of
unemployed adults for an eight week period with fifteen

reading and
classes per week, tutoring in general skills such as

psychological counseling,
writing, instruction in personal behavior,
so
advice about forms and job applications, and

on— all

with the object
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of finding jobs for the long terra unemployed that would not be

"deadend" positions, but would offer long term career opportunities.

Long term unemployed and unemployables were the most serious,
and most visible, community problem.

The contagious spirit of self

improvement, the lack of shame in participating in Westside programs,
the example of the staff there, and the personalized effort available

gave Westside special advantages in helping this group who represented
the greatest challenge to adult education programs.

Westside staff would increase the number in the class to
encourage
twenty adults, run six such programs during the year, and
participate.
additional volunteers and professional instructors to

Such

on both staff and space,
a full time operation would make large demands
into employed productive
but turning more than one hundred welfare cases

impact upon Pasadena and
taxpayers would have a substantial immediate

particularly upon other unemployed workers.
the program, Westside called
In order to develop this part of

two assistant coordinators, four part
for a full time coordinator,

consultants.
time aides, and some outside

The coordinator would have

for organizing the classes, and
primary responsibility for counseling,

His
providing them with consultant advice.
for finding instructors and
program with the local welfare departassistants would coordinate the

segment already funded at Westside.
me nt and with the job development
who would
supervise and train the four aides
in addition they would
individual
assistance in order to handle
work primarily at tutoring
and keep the group together
problems outside of a class situation
the level of instruction.
as much as possible in

125

In order to encourage participation in this program, to offer

some incentive without destroying the atmosphere of self help, Westside

proposed to offer scholarships of $120 to anyone who completed the
eight week program.

That money would pay for incidental expenses

encourage participation, but would not involve a payment large enough
to substitute for a job or welfare.

Thirdly, Westside developed a program of communication improve-

ment for emerging professionals.

David Smith, Associate Professor in

English at the California Institute of Technology, spent three hours
each week with the leaders of the Westside Study Center for work on

basic composition skills.
asked for such help.

Other adults in leadership positions had

Caltech professors in humanities were most

useful for such small discussions with relatively educated students.
The program vjould involve two groups whose participation could augment
the long run success of the Study Center:

Caltech faculty and emerging

middle class Negro professionals who typically have become cut off
from ghetto problems just when they achieve a position where they could

contribute importantly.
In the proposed program Caltech professors would volunteer

their time for a twelve week series, three hours per week.

Two

groups could meet concurrently with three such series during the
year.

Discussion groups limited to five persons would limit total

enrollment to thirty, but the content could be as rich as the groups
wanted.
On a small scale, but crucial to an adult education program

was basic education for functional illiterates.

Volunteers had taught
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reading and simple arithmetic to three functional illiterates.

The

object was to enable these persons to fulfill their legal obligations
and to survive outside a public institution.

Westside knew many individuals who could be helped if it had
space and materials and sufficient staff to organize volunteers for
Only a few could be taught because the talent and

this group.

patience required to achieve success in this program was a rare
commodity.

Nevertheless with space and a staff to organize the effort,

Westside hoped to increase the number from three to ten students, with
further expansion limited only by future recruitment of teachers.

A fifth component was advanced tutoring for job advancement.
Caltech professors had worked with individuals who needed training in
electronics

,

mathematics and experience with wiring.

Those ad hoc

arrangements among individuals who met at the Study Center were
generally quite successful..

As increasingly complex and skilled jobs

of the
became available in the electronics and space industries

such jobs was
Pasadena area, often the best opportunity Blacks had for
to advance within the company.

When they lacked a particular skill or

gain a promotion and find
training, specialized tutoring enabled them to
a more satisfactory career.

its many contacts with
The Westside Staff, taking advantage of

firms, planned to work at
college faculty and with local business
for such advancement.
both ends to encourage the opportunity

Thus they

of job advances if certain tutoring
could seek to obtain firm pledges
tutor.
the tutee with the best available
were performed and then match
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In May, 1968 Westside proposed an additional component
to its

"Late-Start" program:

coordination and counseling for education.

Because people came to the Center with widely different backgrounds
and abilities, it was crucial that they got into the best program for

their purposes.

A forty year old man who finished the sixth grade in

a Mississippi school required vastly different approaches than a

twenty year old clerk-typist who needed a little help with shorthand
in order to keep up in an evening course.

Many persons had special needs

or problems which require a tutoring arrangement on a one to one basis.

The first five components described fairly common situations which

resulted in a somewhat organized formula, but that arrangement did not
insure that persons always got placed in the right category.

Westside proposed an education director with overall responsibility for those programs at Westside and with a primary responsibility
to coordinate those programs with the local high schools and with the

Pasadena City College adult education programs.

Under him would work

two counselors vhose task would be to work out an individualized

educational program which met the needs of those who sought help and
to arrange for special tutoring when needed.

Each would have two part

bring a special ability to
time aides who would help with counseling,
handle the job
communicate with hard core persons, and learn how to

themselves.

administrative
In addition, this segment would have two

educational component.
secretaries to keep central records for the
Westside'

s

of
"Late-Start" program was a unique combination

would seldom be found as
remedial components and components which

part of a typical poverty program.

Basic education and job training
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for the unemployed were important.

But equally important was

communication improvement for emerging professionals.

Westside staff

found jobs for the hard core unemployed, but they also encouraged

people to organize a jazz benefit at the civic auditorium, to explore
techniques in basic encounter and to form Black Studies groups.
Westside'

s

weekly Community Forum best illustrated its impact
Each week from fifty to two hundred local community

in adult education.

residents, Pasadena businessmen, and Caltech professors and students

gathered at Westside to hear lectures and panel discussions.

The topics

ranged from job opportunities, African history, and black power to the

American Nazi Party, the John Birch Society, and drug abuse.

The

Community Forum offered poor people an exposure to ideas and personalities
important to their lives that newspapers and television rarely afforded.
and
The Long term failures of public schools to educate poor

late start.
minority persons meant that too many adults needed a

As

community education, Westside
a vehicle for community action and
the dignity of a wide
offered the hope of basic tools to succeed and

range of intellectual concerns.

Its adult education programs reflected

help and self improvement.
the broadest meaning of self

4.

A Curriculum for the Community

and assess the effect and
There was no simple way to add up

educational programs.
value of Westside Study Center's

The entire

and adult education cost less
operation for tutoring, job training,

non-teaching staff.
than a small elementary school's

By any test of

its
brought an enormous return for
cost-benefit ratio*' the Center
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But that criterion was almost meaningless.

budget.

Since both tutors

and tutees came voluntarily, both individuals must have benefited

from their sessions.

The social gain from each hard core poverty

youth who found counsel and training for a job more than matched the
cost of a staff member’s salary for a year.

Responding to the failures of Pasadena schools, Westside never
developed into a total school system.

Westside kept fewer children

occupied during the school week than did the public school, but then
no truancy laws made anyone come to the Center.

Likewise Westside

could not show a regular advance of classes from year to year in

national tests for reading and arithmetic.

But then Westside’

visitors had already been turned off or declared a failure by the
schools.

If Duke did not find enough of a chance at Westside, the

Center at least gave him a better opportunity than had the public
schools
Westside’

s

successes did not result from some curriculum

package or special method.

Tutors often used the textbooks which

students brought from school.

Sometimes tutors worked with new

Howell wanted tested,
picture and strip take machines which Bell and
own variation of phonics and
but more often tutors developed their

drills in order to teach reading.

Nor did Westside’ s unprepossessing

lacked heating in winter and in
buildings and equipment-one building

explain why the Center attracted
summer its flat roof collected heat—
facilities each week.
more than a thousand visits to its

particular advantages from
Probably the Study Center had some
its location and timing.

changing.
Pasadena was in the process of
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Its black population included many who had moved there for good

schools, and their protests and legal suits kept pressure on the

school board.

The staff

Lionel Larsuel, Jack Allen, Tommy Moore,

Nate Sims, and many aides such as Duke and John White
talents and loyalty.

financial support.

—had

unusual

They made Westside succeed despite a lack of

Public schools had money and a legal mandate to

provide education for everyone.

Their failure defined Westside'

tasks, and its lessons might encourage and enable the schools to

perform their original function.
In simplest terms Westside succeeded because people wanted
to come.

No better test for schools could be devised.

A curriculum

centered on the students' needs and desire for knowledge might avoid
the task of enforcing truancy laws.

Westside Study Center presented

a non-hostile, non- frightening atmosphere.

Noise, disorder, and

difficult questions did not become reasons for disliking kids.

Although

many tutees came to find help in passing an exam in the schools, many
continued coming because they enjoyed learning.

For tutors and adults

Westside provided an opportunity to learn in their own way.
Obviously Westside did not operate a set program for standardized classes.

Center staff had to find out what people wanted when

they came into the building.

Some people needed a tutor who could

particular
understand their personal difficulties as well as help in a

subject material.

Counselors on the staff had to match students

needs

proved simple enough but
and tutors’ abilities, which in some cases

someone with special skills.
in other cases required a search for

flexibility allowed for long or short
That individual attention and
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sessions as many times each week as were desired.

Unlike Pasadena's school system, Westside Study
Center did not
ignore the feelings and self concepts of black
pupils in a predominantly

white system which often acted as though Blacks were
invisible.

From

its inception, Westside had worked on various approaches to
cultural

orientation for Blacks, focusing on black history and the narrower
issues of the relationship of Northwest Pasadena to the rest of the
city.

More crucial for its impact, Westside ran innumerable basic

encounter sessions which dealt openly with the feelings of participants.
Most of Westside'

s

staff became effective facilitators in encounters

which dealt with the sensitive matter of race and bigotry, and at
Western Behavioral Sciences Institute they participated in special
training.
Thus,. all kinds of people came and were involved at Westside.

That was community involvement in which the community was defined,

not arbitrarily, but in terms of those people who found in the Center a

vehicle for their learning.

When business leaders and kids saw each

other meeting in the same building, they had to learn something about
each others' problems.

Westside' s openness and commitment to people

made it a learning center for the community.

The staff became

necessarily students of that community.
Ultimately, then, what Westside created was not an ideal

school but a reflection of what public schools had not done.

Westside

would have had no programs if schools based their curriculum on student
needs.

Schools should have individualized instruction through smaller groups
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and more flexible scheduling.

Schools should have dealt with the

affective domain, if they were to be effective in so-called academic
topics.

And schools should have involved the community as more than

some "poverty board" or participants in an after-hours program if
they were to develop programs which met local needs.

The similarity between Westside’s experience and many
innovations discussed at the School of Education was not pure
The author left Westside for the University of
coincidence.
Massachusetts because Dean Dwight Allen made sense in his call
for individualized instruction, differentiated staffing, flexible
scheduling and relevant curriculum.
11.

CHAPTER

V

THE WESTS IDE PHILOSOPHY-

DESIGN FOR EDUCATION

The programs developed at Westside Study Center reflected

new trends in the national economy and the educational system.

In the

past, entry into the middle class for whites was possible through a

combination of hard work and education, and that upward mobility occurred
often enough to support a widespread belief in self help.

Public educa-

tion had served as a major vehicle through which children could increase

status and income.

But long and expensive training for a professional

examination had not been necessary when Abraham Lincoln rose from
poverty to become the highest paid lawyer in Illinois.
Few were as successful as Abraham Lincoln, but most Americans
in the nineteenth century found work at least as unskilled laborers.

Even though they had few opportunities for advancement, their children
could attend public schools and advance into more skilled jobs or

perhaps professional positions.

In the modern economy, however,

tasks in
sophisticated machines have replaced unskilled and semi-skilled

manufacturing, transportation and some office routines.

Technological

high productivity
progress, which has made possible an unprecedentedly
of the demand for unskilled labor
for skilled labor, has foreclosed much

adjusted to those new manFurthermore, educational programs have not

power needs.
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1.

New Careers and Human Services

Westside Study Center was based on the concept of New
Careers, developed mainly in the human services.

Westside looked to the

human services industries as the area where increasing demand might
provide open ended jobs for residents of Northwest Pasadena.

By 1962,

more than four in ten working Americans held white collar occupations
as office workers, store clerks, computer operators, nurses, teachers,

Increasingly those jobs required a college degree

and social workers.
as a credential.

Hence, poor and minority groups were cut off from the

rapidly growing job markets by a lack of education.

Even those who

finished public school were inadequately trained.
If the problems of hard core unemployment were to be met, some

new means of access to such jobs would have to be found.

Thus New

Careers called for a new status of paraprofessional in such fields as

education and health.

As an aide with opportunity for in-service

and have a
training, such paraprofessionals could perform useful work

real chance to advance into a growing professional field.
combined tradiThe rationale for a New Careers concept, then,
of manpower needs
tional methods of poverty programs with clear trends

on a national level.

their
In 1965, Arthur Pearl and Frank Riessman in

book New Careers for the Poor

identified five goals for a possible

on the United States see
For comparative economic statistics
The
and Its Economic Riture_(New York:
Arnold" B. ttnr^rh,
Macmillan Company, 1964).
1.

ILS^

135

major program:
1.

2.

A sufficient number of jobs for all persons
without work.
The jobs to be so defined and distributed
that placement
exists for the unskilled and uneducated.

3.

The jobs to be permanent and provide
opportunity for life-lone6
careers.

4.

An opportunity for the motivated and talented
poor to advance
from low-skill entry jobs to any station available
to the
more favored members of society.

5.

The work to contribute to the well being of society.

Based on its past performance, the economy would not
automatically

meet those goals; hence a special program was necessary.

First, aggregate

demand for labor might well fall short of full employment.

As Pearl and

Riessman pointed out, "approximately the same number of persons will
be
employed as laborers in 1975 as in 1960— a period in which it is expected
that 20 million workers will enter the labor market."

Second, a large

number of poor persons would not have training for anything but unskilled
jobs, which meant that federal job projects might produce no more

socially useful service than leaf-raking.
In 1965 Senator Gaylord Nelson and Congressman James Scheuer

sponsored an

amendment to the Economic Opportunity Act which allocated

$88 million for a New Careers program in 1967 to provide jobs, training
and supportive services for 30,000 to 40,000 persons.

The program was

"designed to enable chronically unemployed individuals to secure entry

the
Arthur Pearl and Frank Riessman, New Careers for the Poor
Nonprofessional in Human Services (New York: The Free Press, 1965),
2.

:

p. 2

3.

Pearl and Riessman, New Careers for the Poor, p.8.
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positions other than as professionals in the public sector of the
economy with built-in experience."

Scheuer cited a potential employment

of 1.2 million in health areas and approximately

urban improvement and welfare.

3

million in education,

Thus, "a public service employment

training program will have an anti-inflationary impact on the cost of

human services by creating a supply of manpower to keep pace with
increasing demand, while reducing chronic unemployment."^
An effective paraprofessional program had to offer more
than entry jobs with no open-endedness.

As Pearl and Riessman emphasized,

"Persons filling entry positions must have

latitude for limited advance-

ment without being required to undergo extensive additional training."
Schools, city agencies, and business firms should develop new positions

with an intermediate status between an unskilled entry position and a
terminal professional status.

A career lattice could base advancement

on accumulated service, on the job training, increased educational

experience, along with talent and expertise in the field.

Aides trained

in education might progress through a career lattice to full professional

teachers, or they might transfer their experience to related fields such
as counseling,

library services, or health services.

As Westside Study Center had discovered, a career lattice was

not easily maintained without some important changes in performance

United States Code Congressional and Administrative News
(89th Congress, second session, 1966), p.4279.
4.

5.

Pearl and Riessman, New Careers for the Poor

,

p.13.
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expectations.

Aides, assistants, and component directors needed time

off for their own education and they often needed special counseling

and help as they attempted work beyond their supposed training and
capabilities.

At the same time, Westside perennially demonstrated that

such paraprofessionals often did a better job by relying upon their own

thoughts rather than someone's lectures or books.

The mirror technique,

for example, sounded awkward when described but it worked in practice.
As long as unemployment existed as one of the salient facts

about America's urban ghettos and as long as there was work of social

importance, then rational policy indicated that the government should

provide the machinery and procedures connecting that labor pool and
those manpower requirements.

Education, of increasing importance for

economic growth as well as for an individual's job opportunities, seemed
the key to the entire program.

Although taxpayers had raised their

expenditures from $300 per pupil in 1950 to more than $600 by 1968
(measured in constant dollars), school boards and teachers said more

money was needed for a quality education.

The extensive use of aides

was a legitimate way to improve the learning opportunities in a

classroom without an unsupportable rise in taxes and bond issues.

7

For evidence about the difficulties of new careers in
Community Action Agencies, see Frederick Aheam, "Correlates of Job
Status Among Indigenous Nonprofessionals in Community Action Programs,"
Social Science Quarterly 50 (December, 1969), pp. 668-75.
6.

,

Per pupil expenditure statistics from the "Digest of Educational
Statistics," (1968), table 76, p.62.
7.
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In addition, New Careers and human services had several

immediate pay-offs for urban areas.

No large segment of the American

population had as high an unemployment rate as did young
in urban areas.

black males

In Pasadena, that rate often stood above 20 per cent

while the national average was 25 per cent.

As the largest gap between

the promises of the American social system and its performance,

unemployment was a major source for unrest and bitterness and a host
of related symptoms which made up the pathology of American ghettos.

Repeatedly in the 1960's that social "problem

11

became social violence.

The real loss was not in burned buildings or police arrests but in all
the Dukes who never had a chance for productive lives.
As an idea and a program, New Careers offered more than merely

another remedy to "poverty problems."

Unlike most ghetto programs which

aimed at raising some "target population"

above a legally defined

poverty level, the Nelson-Scheuer Amendment provided a chance for hard
status.
£q £0 unemployed to develop a career and a professional

Thus,

a ghetto and current
New Careers provided a link between the problems of

economic and social trends.

The relevant framework for a community

of the ghetto
action agency became not a bibliography on the pathology

but an understanding of modern American society.
exciting possibilities for
New Careers, therefore, offered some

society-huge city
counteracting the dehumanizing forces of mass
impersonality of large companies,
complexes, bland suburban sameness, the

institutional powers and individual
and the growing discrepancy between
powers.

breakdown of traditional
Those forces, when combined with the
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human service institutions such as families and churches, have left
most Americans, rich and poor, without a strong sense of
significance.

The need for human services to facilitate communication

and to restore to individuals a sense of importance
and of possible meaning
in their lives becomes imperative in light of a shrinking world community.

Indeed, paraprofessionals in education, health, and social

services might restore a more personal kind of human relationship to

work which had become increasingly dominated by impersonal professional
attitudes.

People were processed by number so that machines would

do the work; and teachers, nurses, welfare workers, and a host of others

who dealt with people in their work seemed to have no time to see and
deal with a unique individual.

Schools ranked students into various

tracks within the school on the basis of some composite score which

ignored their mixture of skills, talents, and possible contributions.
Ideally, aides in the classroom might offer small-group instruction,

provide counseling for individuals who were frightened by the professional
teacher, and allow the teacher more time to learn with students on an

individual basis.

Westside Study Center's New Careers program in human services
applied not only

to its own staff and programs but also to many others

in the Pasadena Community.

Middle class housewives whose daily routines

had lost meaning found something important for themselves in tutoring

young children.

University professors, seeking an outlet for humani-

tarian urges, found fulfillment at Westside.

Business men who needed

found ways to
labor and felt frightened by racial misunderstanding
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communicate through Westside's help.

To a large degree because its

New Careers approach did not require professional skills, Westside

provided an important focal point for Pasadenans who wanted to do

something about their city but did not know how.

2.

The Failure of Schools

The failure of schools to grasp those changes in manpower

needs and human needs largely justified their critics' charges that
they operated out of a nineteenth century perspective.

At a time when

automation has eliminated many low skilled jobs, public schools have
not begun to educate for skilled and professional work.

Urban schools

have failed to graduate as many as 88 per cent of black and other
minority students and have neglected to educate even those who have
gotten a degree.

For poor and minority groups, inadequate education

all.
has meant not hard work for low wages but no work at

Those who

get ahead have
have advised Blacks to go to school, work hard, and

society.
not grasped the changed nature of contemporary
of backgrounds
Instead of responding to a broad perspective

schools have clung to "academic
and experiences among their pupils,

designed to bolster Iowa
standards" and a liberal arts curriculum
and daughters of the white
Achievement and SAT scores for the sons

middle class.

of black
Rather than destroying the self concepts

Dick and Jane and Stanford
children with a curriculum directed toward
off spending their budgets
University, urban schools would be better
for basketball courts and films.

But better still, schools could

j

children,
to the lives and needs of
design a curriculum which related
- _
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whether their parents happened to be poor or Black or Mexican American
O

or anything else other than white middle class and suburban.

Symptomatic of a misguided school policy has been the failure
of schools with a substantial minority enrollment to introduce black

history into their curriculum.

A report to the California State

Department of Education by six distinguished historians in 1964
analyzed the six major California texts for American history and
found "the virtual omission of the Negro."

Black children read text

books designed to sell to white Southerners, which ignored important

Negro contributions, portrayed slavery in benevolent terms, under-

played slave rebellions, falsified the experience of Reconstruction,
omitted the long twentieth century story of segregation and anti-

black violence, and slighted the importance of the civil rights moveWorse 3 till, a false story has been portrayed of Blacks to

ment.

white (and black) Americans.

Uncle Tom*

Cabin, Gone With the Wind

,

and Tarzan movies put over a stereotype of black history which was

never contradicted in most classrooms.

9

For further discussion on the relation of self concept to academic
Low
achievement, see E. Blake Jr., "Color Prejudice and the Education of
Education,
(1965),
34
Negro
of
Journal
West,"
Income Negroes in the North and
as
Status
Class
and
Group
"Minority
288-98. and Martin Deutsch,
pp.
Achievement,
Related to Social and Personality Factors in Scholastic
1960
no.
pp. 22-26.
2,
Society for Applied Anthropology monograph
8.

,

,

an article
This paragraph and the following three are based on
New
History,"
Black
by Atron A. Gentry and Robert L. Woodbury, "Why
26 (Winter, 1969), PP*
England Social Studies Bulletin
9.

,
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The case for black history for Blacks was as simple as the

need for student centered learning.

Much of traditional curriculums

had little significance or meaning for children in America’s ghettos.
Many black children had little respect for themselves or their possibilities for success

— or

had little left after their school experiences.

When given a chance to read about black inventors, about Othello, about
slaves dying rather than accepting servitude, about black men with

pride and dignity, black children had an altered image of themselves,
their motivation, and their ability to achieve.
If past were past, the consequences of text books which ignored

black history, reading materials which told stories about life in white
frame suburban houses, and teachers who had never experienced nor read

about Blacks would not have such tragic consequences for children.

But

was in
since most white Pasadenans believed the civil rights struggle

Northwest
Mississippi and Alabama rather than in Watts, Compton, and

problem of race relations
Pasadena, they could not cope with the national
Blacks could get a perspective
Unaware of their past, neither whites nor
on their current situation.

facto
If the schools which perpetuated de

how could bright black
segregation in Pasadena ignored that issue,
about the value of reading and
youth trust them to be more honest

algebra?
of course, went beyond
The task of teaching black history,

national
few paperbound reports by
introducing a better text book and a

commissions to students.

effective course
The challenge of offering an

level
well as cognitive or rational
involved emotions and feelings as
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input.

The myths and prejudices which form the baggage of most

Americans knowledge about race relations involve substantial emotional
'

hang ups.

The development of understanding must be approached in a

manner quite different from introductory biology or economics.

Many

racist attitudes were shaped by television, movies, and scattered reading

which were usually not discussed in a classroom.

Thus a free atmosphere

was essential in order to discuss the sources of white racism in
America.
As Westside discovered, there were ways to discuss and learn

about personal feelings, attitudes, and sensitivity which creative
teachers could use.

Black-white encounter sessions for teachers and

students made discussion possible and fruitful.

introduced whites to black roles and vice versa.

Role playing techniques

Basic encounter

sessions for teachers, policemen, and social workers did not assure
an attitude change, but they helped to loosen up people so that they

could discuss prejudice

— both

their own and their reactions to others'.

More than an integrated textbook or more accurate history, that awareness was often the beginning of a daily education in the pervasive
Disorders
white racism which, as the National Advisory Commission on Civil

pointed out, "now threaten [s] the future of every American."
curriculum for
The immediate irrelevance of the typical school
term irrelevance of
poor and black children was compounded by the long

schooling in today's world.
for a meaningful job.

Schools thought they prepared their graduates

and
Thirty years ago, when few went to college

that certification at least assured
only about half finished high school,
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white Americans a starting position in the upper half of society.

Now

a school diploma scarcely assures anyone of a place in the middle class.

The knowledge explosion of the past two decades has made the pretense of

Certification based on pre-service training a futile enterprise.

higher education as well, the same pressures exist.

In

What could academic

certification mean in a profession like sociology when over half the
literature in the field has been written in the last ten years?^
As many states have moved toward open enrollment in institutions

of higher education, the certification process has broken down.

While

aware of that anachronism, college students have been caught between
their parents'

faith in the economic value of a degree and their

professors' faith in academic standards.

Kenneth Keniston expressed it:

Students know better.

As

"The causes of student protest lie

not only in the psyches of students, but even more in the world we
inhabit.

The shameful legacy of racism, America's dubious imperial role

in the world, the inertia and compromises of our universities

— these

are the simple facts against which the ethical impulse of the young is
directed.
As Westside had recognized, and as a 1969 Newsweek poll confirmed,

One recent study has indicated that more learning experiences
Such programs are conducted by
now occur outside classroom than inside.
services, correspondence
military
the
business, governments, unions,
and instructional
organizations
community
schools, anti-poverty programs,
C, p.29,
section
See New York Times (March 27, 1970),
television.
column 6.
10.

11.
p. 79.

1969),
Kenneth Keniston as quoted in the Saturday Review (June 21,
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schools had failed to prepare white middle class Americans for the
good
Of those polled, 46 per cent agreed while 36 per cent disagreed

life.

that their nation had changed for the worse.

per cent anticipated increased problems.

As for the 1970's, 59

Peter Schrag explained that

increasing disillusion in a Saturday Review article:
a country of outsiders precisely because the world

everywhere else

— seems

— at

"We have become

home and

no longer manageable. "12

Education had created ideas faster than people could

assimilate them.
ideas and action,"

"If there had ever been a center, a mainstream of

Schrag wrote, "it rested in the belief that things

were manageable, and that all men and all things would participate."
When that seemed no longer possible, people dropped out, and leaders
spoke hollow rhetoric:

"We do not end the war, but pretend that it

no longer exists or that is has been forgotten; we do not eliminate
poverty, but disregard it; we do not risk hope that may remain unfulfilled, but take hope away."

Racism and bigotry have excluded most of

the poor, especially minorities, from the right to try the American

And for the middle class, the decay of cities, inflation,

dream.

racial conflict, and an undeclared war made the rewards of that dream

bitter-sweet.
The poor, who have been denied even the opportunity of

succeeding at education, look upon student unrest at the universities

(October
"The Troubled American," Newsweek
America, Saturday
in
Place
of
6
1969), p. 35; Peter Schrag, "Out
in next paragraph.
quoted
Schrag also
Review (May 9, 1970). p. 49.
12.

,

,
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with understandable cynicism.

Yet their experiences in the schools and

the experiences of their children speak to them with immediacy.
face abandonment by rich and poor alike.

Schools

Public education, if it is

to survive with a major social function, must relate what it does in

classrooms to the live issues and problems of society.

In terms of

human lives wasted, urban schools, more than suburban schools, have to
provide a meaningful and useful education for their students.

3.

The Hope Factor

The Westside Study Center was a hope factor for Pasadena's
It served as a vehicle of hope for the "disadvantaged"

poor people.

poor

— people

able.

whom society deemed untouchable, unteachable, and undesir-

Society looked at them as nothing but a burden and a problem.

Black and poor people were treated as if they were not even there, having

nothing

— neither

brains nor will

— and

could amount to nothing.

Therefore

their
they would end up with nothing which was counted as a reward by

society.

Westside Study Center offered self confidence, self determination, and hope for all people who came there.

It denied the necessity

help himself or become
of a college degree before an individual could

involved.
help.

who wanted to
No one was turned away who wanted help or

hope factor with
The Study Center was over-all an educational

the community as its classroom.

Westside Study Center tried to
As a self help organization,
to
only meaningful to themselves but
make people feel meaningful, not
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society.

Westside tried to take people from a negative attitude

toward a more positive attitude.

The aim of the Center was to let

people go as far as their potential would let them.

Westside not

only let people know what their opportunities were, but showed them
that they could move from one area to another.

Westside spread the hope factor to members of the black
community in Pasadena.

A youth who had grown up on the block had a range

of four to six blocks.

He had limited needs

and enough money to put gas in the car.

build a "front"

— an

youth was blocked in

— shoes,

an old car, clothes,

It was important to him to

image of himself held by those on the block.

— limited

by his environment.

This

He needed to be

provided with new experiences and to expand his needs.
He,

like the Dukes and John Whites, had to have tools to deal

with that growth, to realize that he had natural abilities and talents,
Those

and to develop ways to use those qualities for his own benefit.

tools and realizations and new needs represented the hope factor for
an individual

— hope

that he could do something positive with his life

and make a better life for himself and his family.

Thus, he could

develop the necessary control over the direction of his life and over
his environment.
Westside’

s

programs of education, job development, community

service, and sensitivity training were designed as vehicles for
needs and
community members to develop themselves and expand their

experiences.

According to the Council of Economic Advisers,

poverty

breeds poverty.

A poor individual or family has a high probability

of staying poor.

illness;
Low incomes carry with them high risks of
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limitation of mobility; limited access to education, information, and
training.

Poor parents cannot give their children the opportunities

for better health and education needed to improve their lot."

Most

important, as the Council pointed out, "lack of motivation, hope, and

incentive is a more subtle but no less powerful barrier than lack of
financial means.

Thus the cruel legacy of poverty is passed from

parents to children. "13
At the national level, social scientists have found evidence
for little else but a continuous cycle of poverty.

But any local

community action organization which talked of nothing but a "cycle
of poverty" or "culture of poverty" destroyed an individual's hope of

trying to help himself.

At the national level, the hope factor sounded

naive and overly optimistic.

But even the Council of Economic Advisers

recognized hope as "a more subtle but no less powerful barrier"

than

poverty itself.

Westside Study Center knew the paradox of the hope factor
that it was the only thing that worked for individuals and that it made
But in its New Careers concept, in its

no sense as a national program.

tutoring program, in basic encounter sessions, Westside achieved an
"end run" out of the cycle of poverty by creating a link between those
in power and those without power.

Therefore Westside saw itself in terms of national economic

"Economic Report of the President, January 1964," quoted in
Miller, Poverty American Style p.102.
13.

,
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trends and current changes in the nature of
education.

It had to know

about Caltech, federal career opportunity programs,
manpower needs,

current federal segregation suits, and cybernation.

If it limited its

scope and understanding to compensatory education and
leaf-raking jobs
for youth, it merely perpetuated the cycle of poverty.

Just as New

Careers linked changing manpower needs with the hard core unemployed,

Westside attempted to link its whole educational program to the changing
needs of society.
The reason that schools, poverty programs and city agencies

could not get away with rhetoric about a "cycle of poverty" and "the

disadvantaged" was probably as simple as Lincoln’s faith that "you can't
fool all of the people all of the time."

To move above the poverty

level from $3,000 a year to $3,500 still left the poor and Black minorities

powerless relative to society.

If schools, poverty agencies and

communities such as Pasadena were to succeed, they had to aim higher.

Westside Study Center knew that, although the idea made little sense
to bureaucrats and academicians, the hope factor worked.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ESSAY

Chapter

I

The description and analysis of the Westside Study Center is

based on the personal and official files which
years as Director of Westside.

thousand items including:

I

maintained during my

These files contain approximately five

minutes of the Board of Directors, program

proposals, correspondence, records and documents, evaluation reports
(such as Thomas Anderson and Harry Krasnick, "Westside Study Center

Youth Development Program Final Evaluation Report," [Economic and Youth

Opportunities Agency of Greater Los Angeles, November 1966]), tapes,
films such as "Black Anger," and many newspaper articles from the Los

Angeles Times

Eagle

•

,

the Pasadena Independent Star-News

,

and the Pasadena

.

An item of particular interest that
files is Pat Sutton's "Duke:

I

have kept in the Westside

A Study in Deviance."

Mrs. Sutton, then

a graduate student in sociology at the University of Southern California,

based her paper on extensive interviews with one of Westside' s aides.
For a comparison of the effectiveness and innovativeness of

Westside' s programs in Pasadena, other programs funded through E.Y.O.A.
and P.C.H.N.O. offer relevant material:

Pasadena Recreation Department;
3.

2.

1.

"The Hut" operated by the

"Backyard Mothers Club" in Pasadena;

Los
"Neighborhood Adult Participation Program" in Pasadena and

Angeles;

4.

"Haven House" in Pasadena;
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5.

"Project Head Start" especially
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in Pasadena; 6.

"Youth Training and Employment Program (YTEP)" in Los

Angeles; and

"Westminster Community Center" in Watts.

7.

Other programs which build on the principle of self help
include:

"Operation Bootstrap" in Los Angeles, "Media Fellowship

House" in Media, Pennsylvania, and "South Arsenal Neighborhood Development

Corporation" in Hartford, Connecticut.
Also, comparison with the "HARYOU" program in New York City is
useful.

See Dr. Kenneth B. Clark’s description in Dark Ghetto (New

Harper Row, 1965) and Clark and Jeanette Hopkins, A Relevant

York:

War Against Poverty (New York:

Harper Row, 1969).

A number of authors have influenced my analysis of Westside and the
self help concept:

Essien-Udom, Black Nationalism (New York:

E.U.

Dell

Publishing Co., 1962); Anthony Lewis, Portrait of a Decade (New York:
Bantam Books, 1965); James Farmer, Freedom When? (New York:
House, 1965); Paul Jacobs, Prelude to Riot (New York:
1968)

;

Robert Conot, Rivers of Blood

Bantam Books, 1967)

;

To Be Equal (New York:

C

New York:

Bantam Books, 1968); Whitney Young, Jr.,

McGraw-Hill, 1964); Jerry Cohen and William

Murphy, Burn, Baby, Bum!

Avon Books, 1966); Martin Luther

(New York:

King, Jr., Why We Can’t Wait
,

Years of Darkness

Random House,

Report of the National Advisory Commission on

Civil Disorders (New York:

Luther King, Jr.

,

Random

C.

Where We Go From Here

Other works include:

Signet Books, 1963); Martin

New York:

E.

(

New York:

Bantam Books, 1966).

Franklin Frazier, The Negro Family

in the United States , revised and abridged edition (Chicago:

University of Chicago Press, 1966);
Bourgeoisie (New York:

E.

Franklin Frazier, Black

Free Press, 1957); Talcott Parsons and

The
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Kenneth Clark, editors, The Negro American
(Boston:

Beacon Press,

1965); Kenneth B. Clark, Prejudice and Your Child
(Boston:

Press, 1955); and William Haddard and

G.

Beacon

Douglas Pugh, editors,

Black Economic Development C Englewood Cliffs,

N. J.

:

Prentice-Hall,

1969).

Chapter II

information on the City of Pasadena has been drawn
from a variety of newspaper articles in the Pasadena Star-News and
the

Pasadena Independent Star-News

.

One recent article that summarizes

the changes that have occurred in Pasadena in the past thirty years
is Dorothy Townsend, "Pasadena's Crown City Image Tarnished," Los

Angeles Times

,

Section B, April 27, 1969.

For a description of Pasadena's economic situation and plans
to

meet problems of growth,

I

have relied upon the work of the

Stanford Research Institute, referred to in the text as Robert W.
Oliver, An Economic Survey of the City of Pasadena (Pasadena, California:

The Pasadena Chamber of Commerce, May 1959).

The discussion of Pasadena's "Pepper Project" rests upon

publications of the Community Redevelopment Agency of the City of
Pasadepa, including: the "Redevelopment Plan," the "Industrial Plan,"
and "The Pepper Project Community Newsletter."

are used here:

Two research reports

one is of a statistical nature, "Neighborhood Social

Diagnostic Survey," prepared by the Community Redevelopment Agency;
the other is a descriptive survey, Ben Magubane and Anthony Ngubo,
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"Report of the Pepper Area Research Project," Pasadena, California;

American Friends Service Committee, September 1965.

A critical view

of the "Pepper Project" is presented in a series in The Pasadena Eagle

,

April 19-July 6, 1968.
For an overview of the problems of urban renewal, see studies
in James Q. Wilson, editor, Urban Renewal

(Cambridge, Massachusetts:

:

The Record and the Controversy

The M.I.T. Press, 1966), and Peter Rossi

and Robert Dentler, The Politics of Urban Renewal (New York:

Free

Press, 1961).
My sources for the politics of the Pasadena City Schools start

chronologically with David Hulburd, This Happened in Pasadena (New York:
The MacMillan Company, 1951).

Hulburd describes a community conflict

over educational issues which resulted in the firing of the super-

intenent of schools and possibly the end of educational progress in
Pasadena.

I

have relied on Coleman’s case study of Pasadena and

school redistricting contained in James

Educational Opportunity
Office, 1966).

I

(

Washington D.C.

S.

:

Coleman,

ejt

al , Equality of

U.S. Government Printing

have been aided by reports such as:

"Pasadena City

Pasadena:
Schools Racial and Ethnic Distritution of Enrollment,"

Department of Research, Pasadena City Schools, October 1966;
Citizens iask
"Preliminary Report to the Board of Education from the

Force Study Committee on High School Redistricting,

February 7, 1967,

Pasadena Council of Parents
and "Report on High School Districting,"
and Teachers, May 8, 1967.
on Urban Community
For two years I have taught a course

Relations.

problems discussed in
This course has dealt with the
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Chapter II as well as similar problems in Springfield, Massachusetts;

New York City; Philadelphia, Pennslyvania

;

Temple City, California; and

other cities where I have had an opportunity to discuss community
relations problems with citizens and officials.

For a comparison of

school-community relations problems in other cities see Naomi Levine,
Schools in Crisis
1969 )

;

:

Ocean Hill-Brownsville (New York:

Popular Library,

chapters V and VI of Peter Schrag, Village School Downtown

(Boston:
(New York:

Beacon Press, 1967 ); David Rogers, 110 Livingston Street

Random House, 1969 ).

CHAPTER

III

An excellent basic source for this chapter has been Charles

Valentine, Culture and Poverty (Chicago:
Press, 1968 ).

The University of Chicago

.

Many writers have written about poverty:
In the Midst of Plenty (New York:

Poor Pay More (New York:

Ben Bagdikian,

Signet, 1964); David Caplovitz, The

The Free Press, 1967); Michael Harrington,

The Other America (New York:

The Macmillan Co., 1962); John

editor, Race and Poverty (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.

:

P.

(Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:

Kain,

Prentice Hall, 1969);

Burton A. Weisbroad, editor, The Economics of Poverty

Paradox

F.

:

An American

Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1965);

Miller, editor, Poverty American Style (Belmont, California:

Herman
Wadsworth

Publishing Co., Inc., 1966 ).
Books and articles on the War on Poverty and community action
include:

Kenneth B. Clark and Jeanette Hopkins, A Relevant War Agains_t
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Poverty (New York:

Harper and Row, 1969); Daniel

Feasible Misunderstanding (New York:

P.

Moynihan, Maximum

Free Press, 1969); Martin Rein

and S.M. Miller, "The Demonstration Project as a Strategy of Change,"
in Mayer Zald, Organizing for Community Welfare (Chicago:

Quadrangle

Books, 1967); Raphael 0. Nystrand, "The Impact of Community Action

Programs upon School Systems, in David Street, editor, Innovations
in Mass Education (New York:

John Wiley and Sons, 1969); Ralph M.

Kramer, Participation of the Poor (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:
Hall, 1969);

Prentice

Ralph M. Kramer, editor, Readings in Community Organization

Practice (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:

Prentice Hall, 1969); Harry

C.

Bredemier, "The Politics of the Poverty Cold War," Urban Affairs Quarterly
_3,

(June, 1968)

;

Daniel P. Moynihan, editor, On Understanding Poverty

Basic Books, Inc., 1968).

(New York:

The second section of Chapter III deals with Westside*

programs and is based on my personal files on the Westside Study Center.

Included in this material are:

Memoranda and directives from the

Office of Economic Opportunity, the Economic and Youth Opportunities
Agency, the Pasadena Commission on Human Needs and Opportunities, and
programs;
the U.S. Department of Labor; proposals for funding Westside

evaluative reports; newspaper articles; and my testimony before the

Congressional Sub-Committee on Poverty Programs in Los Angeles.

CHAPTER

I

IV

Director
have relied on my personal and official files as

this chapter on educational
of the Westside Study Center in developing

programs at Westside.

the
The most pertinent items in the files are

,
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many educational proposals which Westside prepared for various funding

Evaluative reports in the files include "Westside Study

agencies.

Center Youth Development Program Final Evaluation Report"

prepared

by the Economic and Youth Opportunities Agency of Greater Los Angeles.
For a comparison of Westside' s educational programs

I

have

the proposal of the South Arsenal Neighborhood Development

read:

Corporation, November, 1969; "Planning for an Urban Community School,"

Springfield (Mass.) Public Schools, July 1968; Nathan Kravetz, "Academic
Excellence in an Inner City Elementary School," The Center for Urban

Education (New York City), 1968; the proposal of the Wilmington, Del.

Public Schools for a "Brandywine Education Center," 1970.
I

have also been influenced by books and articles on tutorial

programs, adult education, manpower needs and economic growth, and

encounter groups:

Donald Smith, "The Street Is the Community School,"

Education and Urban Society , August, 1969; David

J.

Fox, Audrey Herr,

Norman Shapiro, "Supportive Training for Inexperienced and New Teachers,"
The Center for Urban Education (New York City), 1969; William

F.

Haddad

and Douglas Pugh, editors, Black Economic Development (Englewood Cliffs,

Prentice Hall, 1969); Creative Developments in the Training of

N.J.:

Educational Personnel (Washington:

U.S. Government Printing Office,

1969); John Holt, How Children Fail (New York:

Dell Publishing Co.,

1964); John Holt, How Children Learn (New York:
(Boston:
1967); Carl Rogers, On Becoming a Person

1961)

;

Innovation in Education:

(New York:

Pitman Publishing Co.,

Houghton Mifflin,

New Directions for the America n Scho ol,

Rosenthal,
Committee for Economic Development, 1968); Robert
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Pygmalion in the Classroom

(New York:

Holt, Rinehart, and Winston,

1968) although Rosenthal's evidence has been challenged, his conclusions

are still correct; David Street, "Educational Change in the Mass Society,"

David Street, editor. Innovation in Mass Education

(New York:

John

Wiley & Sons, 1969); Robert Reiff and Frank Riessman, "The Indigenous
Nonprofessional:

A Strategy of Change in Community Action and Community

Mental Health Programs," Community Mental Health Journal monograph
series, 1965.

CHAPTER V

I

services:

have read extensively in the area of "New Careers" in human
Frank Riessman and Arthur Pearl, New Careers for the Poor

The Nonprofessional in Human Service

Jacob R. Fishman, et

Services (Washington:

Gordon

J.

al

,

(New York:

:

Free Press, 1965);

New Careers for the Disadvantaged in Human

Howard University, 1968)

;

Garda W. Bowman and

Klopf , New Careers and Roles in the American School (New York:

Bank Street College of Education, 1967); Youth Tutoring Youth (New York:

National Commission on Resources for Youth, 1968); Timothy Leggatt,
"The Use of Nonprofessionals in Large-City Systems," David Street
editor, Innovation in Mass Education (New York:
1969); Dwight W. Allen and Lloyd Kline,

University of Massahcusetts

,

John Wiley

&

Sons,

Dif f erentiated Staffing,

1969.

From the point of view of a non-professional person dealing
with the failure of urban schools,

I

found Carl Rogers useful

and to the
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point; especially On Becoming a Person (Boston:

and Freedom to Learn (Columbus, Ohio:

Houghton Mifflin, 1961);

Merrill Publishing Co., 1969).
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The Westside Study Center was a community self help organi-

zation directed toward innovative responses to the failures of
urban education.

Founded in 1965 by young black men in the North-

west area of Pasadena, California, the Center began as a tutoring

program and expanded, during the years 1965-1968, into a fullfledged community action organization embracing education, job

training and development, community services, and public relations.

The Center operated on a New Careers basis

— as

staff

developed skills, they moved to positions of more responsibility.
The staff were paraprofessionals
and learning.

,

whose jobs involved both teaching

Westside’ s success answered the question of whether

an institution might serve as a vehicle for many persons to learn

and succeed in a society marked by racism and economic competition.
The story of Westside Study Center presents an analysis of

urban community relations.

The Center existed only because of the

failure of Pasadena to provide equal education, housing, community
services, and job opportunities for its black citizens.

De facto

segregation in the schools, combined with inadequate facilities
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an d indifferent teachers and administrators,
left black children

without the skills and the self confidence
to compete in Pasadena.
Racism and failure to deal constructively with
urban problems were
not unique to Pasadena.

On the contrary, Pasadena resembled many

medium sized American cities in its political, social
and educational structures.

While the Westside Study Center developed its programs in

Northwest Pasadena, the federal government launched its War on
Poverty based on community action and "maximum feasible participation" of the poor.

After Watts, in the face of increased political

pressure, the War on Poverty’s concept of community action came more
to resemble community inaction and riot prevention.

Westside

demonstrated that self help and community caring was more successful
and less contradictory than the War on Poverty's so-called community
action.

Westside Study Center developed extensive programs in education, job training and job development, and adult education.

In

each program, interaction on a one to one basis, establishing trust
and self confidence, and the New Careers concept of upward mobility

were basic ingredients.

The Center broadened its base of support

as its programs for "disadvantaged" Blacks in the community attracted

the support and participation of many white students, educators,

businessmen, and politicians in Pasadena at large.
The key to Westside Study Center's impact in Pasadena was
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in Providing the "hope factor."

Westside convinced both those

in power and out of power, both the
advantaged and the disadvan-

taged, that they could realize their potential
and become change

agents in their society.

The success of the "hope factor" and

Westside Study Center’s programs suggests new alternatives
for
urban community relations, racial conflict, and urban
education.

